Lacking any clear articulation of its national interest, Ethiopia’s positions regarding the AU are highly personalized and dependent on its leadership.

In this article it is argued that a replacement of Ethiopia’s ad hoc practice to a much-needed host nation policy, as part of a grand strategy or standalone policy, cannot be overemphasized.

In a nutshell such a host country policy should set out a relevant normative, institutional, collaborative and financial framework.
Ethiopia and the AU:
Special Responsibilities of a Host Nation

Dr.iur. MEHARI TADDELE MARU AND ABEL ABATE DEMISSIE

November 2018
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I. List of Abbreviations Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>AGOA</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>Africa Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>Africa Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<td>AUHIP</td>
<td>AU High Level Implementation Panel</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>Africa Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
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<td>FANSPS</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum for China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GERD</td>
<td>Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam</td>
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<td>GoE</td>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>HNP</td>
<td>Host Nation Policy</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>NBI</td>
<td>Nile Basin Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council (of Libya)</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan African Conference</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan African Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community(s)</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGoNU</td>
<td>Transitional Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>TICAD</td>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>Union of Islamic Courts</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force for Abyei</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>United Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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This study covers only policies and issues up to end of 2017.

Mehari Taddele Maru
Abel Abate
November 2018
Ethiopia and the AU: Special Responsibilities of a Host Country

"Fundamental tenets of the Ethiopian Movement were self-worth, self-reliance and freedom. These tenets drew the advocates of Ethiopianism like a magnet, to the growing political movement. That political movement was to culminate in the formation of the ANC in 1912. It is in this sense that the ANC, we, trace the seeds of the formation of our organisation to the Ethiopian Movement of the 1890s."

Nelson Mandela, Nobel Laureate and Former President of South Africa

1. Introduction

This paper examines Ethiopia's policy on the African Union (AU), and its predecessor—the OAU, both as founding member and hosting nation. By defining what constitutes a grand strategy, as opposed to an ad hoc approach in pursuing national interest in a multilateral setting, the paper attempts to answer seven fundamental questions: (i) Has Ethiopia ever had a grand strategy regarding the OAU/AU, and if so, what are or were the main tenants of such a grand strategy or policy? (ii) Are there points of convergence and divergence in the policies of the three regimes of Emperor Haile Selassie, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn in respect of their policies toward the OAU/AU? (iii) Which of Ethiopia's state institutions currently guide and formulate policies and decisions with regard to the AU and Pan African Community Organizations? (iv) How does Ethiopia's approach to the AU differ from other key regional players such as Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Algeria? (v) The Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) refers to the 'special responsibilities of Ethiopia' to the AU. What do 'special responsibilities' entail? (vi) Does Ethiopia have a hosting country policy? Is there a need for a host nation policy? (vii) by way of policy recommendations, what considerations should Ethiopia take into account in formulating a grand strategy and host nation policy?

Before attempting to answer these questions, the paper first addresses the definition of the term 'grand strategy' and summarizes major reviews and critiques about Ethiopia's influence on the AU/OAU.

In this paper, 'grand strategy' refers to integrated long-term thinking encapsulating a full-fledged comprehensive normative (policy), institutional, and financial framework that guides and utilizes economic, military, technological and intellectual resources in pursuit of national interest. A grand strategy requires an enduring political orientation that clearly stipulates a desirable end state, with identified feasible means and clear directions of achieving the end state based on a realistic and sincere assessment of the existing state of affairs. A classic example of grand strategy is that of containment during the Cold War. With regard to the topic at hand, a grand Ethiopian strategy on the AU would mean a clear formulation of the interests of Ethiopia and its 'desired status' within the AU and the Pan African community; identification of the requisite economic, military, technological and intellectual resources required for reaching...
the end state; formulating clear policy directions; and establishing the required institutional mechanisms to achieve the desired end state. With long-term intent, monitoring trends and exercising foresight may serve as the foundations of a grand strategy.

As in the case of other countries with similar host country responsibilities, Ethiopia may need to develop a stand-alone policy on the AU. In order to showcase the need for such a policy, the case of Belgium as a host nation is discussed in detail from page 30.

The article argues that Ethiopia’s policy towards the OAU/AU depended on the personalities and practices of the country’s leaders and explains why this *ad hoc* practice should be replaced by a system of institutional and policy-based foreign relations. Partially attributable to the EPRDF-led government’s disproportionately inward looking foreign policy, Ethiopia’s policy toward the AU exhibits a reactive, confined and *ad hoc* approach.

The main domestic anchors of Ethiopia’s foreign policy have been development and stability. Therefore, its foreign policy has focused on ensuring collective security and countering direct external threats to Ethiopia. In contrast to its unmistakably clear policies toward IGAD and the Member States, and in respect of the Nile Basin riparian countries, FANPS does not bestow the same necessary emphasis on Ethiopia-AU relations.

Similarly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, developed its ministry level Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), based and aligned to the Second Growth and Transformation Plan 2015/16-2019/20. In substance, the GTP of MoFA is similar to the FANPS, while it provides some additional policy and implementation directions. It begins with the quick appraisal global, continental, bilateral and multilateral cooperation in addition to a very limited domestic issue. A slight change was introduced in the 2016 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) where three major new priority areas were introduced. These include situational analysis on AU, ‘national image building’ and strengthening AU so as it is an effective ‘instrument for peace, development and integration’. As the FANPS is too broad to provide details on Ethiopia’s strategic direction on the AU, similarly the Second Growth and Transformation Plan of the Ministry is also too broad to be considered a grand strategy.

In conclusion, the article argues that irrespective of the personalities of its leaders and the lack of a stand-alone policy towards the AU or even IGAD, Ethiopia’s influence within the IGAD and the AU will continue to grow due to its history, large population, strategic geographic location, military strength and recent promising economic performance. Apart from its commendable diplomatic, peace and security contributions. By providing integrative opportunities through its fast construction of transportation and energy infrastructure, (road, rail, air and electricity), Ethiopia has become an engine of regional integration in Africa. Perhaps Ethiopia’s newest and finest contribution to Africa is its inspirational developmental state ideology and its fast-economic growth, despite not being an oil exporter. Ethiopia’s development has sown hopes in Africa and inspired Africans to consider the real possibility of African-led fast economic development without depending on natural resources.

However, the intellectual competence, persuasive skills, Pan-African disposition, personal ambition and trust that Ethiopia’s leader enjoys, at any given time, from the IGAD region and within
the Pan-African and international community, will determine what degree of influence the country enjoys within these regional and global governance institutions.

Furthermore, FANSPS is too broad to effectively determine the special responsibilities of Ethiopia as the host nation of the AU Headquarters, Pan African community, and those accredited to the AU. It also fails to clearly identify the specific interests of Ethiopia in the AU and Pan African community. Similarly, the existing Host Country Agreement with the AU, operational directives and commitments under international law are too narrow to constitute an Ethiopian policy towards the AU and the Pan African community.

Hence, in order to maintain and increase Ethiopia’s influence in the AU, in addition to and beyond the personal capacity of its leaders and the country’s excessively inward-looking policy, its vague and *ad hoc* approach to the AU needs to change. Ethiopia needs to formulate and implement a strategic stand-alone policy and institutional mechanism governing its relations with the AU. First, a Host Country Policy would enable Ethiopia to effectively govern the special responsibilities of Ethiopia as the host nation of the AU Headquarters, the Pan African community, and those representatives accredited to the AU. Second, such policy would define the specific interests of Ethiopia in the AU and Pan African community. Third, the policy could detail the aims and mechanisms of working through Pan African institutions to promote and defend their interests and also Pan African positions. Fourth, the policy could identify those areas in which Ethiopia, as a founding and active member of the AU and Pan African community, has been making momentous contributions to Africa and the AU, and whatever additional contributions it might make in the future.

The policy and its institutional framework need to be anchored inwardly, not only to protect but also to promote the interest of Ethiopia and the region at the AU level. Such a policy should also enable Ethiopia, and its capital Addis Ababa, to discharge their ‘special responsibility’ as identified in the FANSPS, not only in servicing the Pan African Community, including Civil Society Organizations working on Pan African issues, but also in setting an example for the rest of Africa in upholding the core values of the AU.
2. Brief History of Foreign Policy in Ethiopia

2.1 Imperial Ethiopian Policy: Territorial Integrity and Sacrifice to the OAU Ideals.
As one of the world’s most ancient civilizations, Ethiopia has maintained bilateral relations with some countries for many centuries. However, formal institutionalized diplomacy only began with the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1907. During the imperial regime, the diplomatic work revolved around securing the territorial integrity of Ethiopia with a focus on claiming Eritrea and Somalia and to a limited extent on Djibouti. Supported by his bureaucratic advisers, Emperor Haile Selassie adopted a progressive anti-colonial and anti-apartheid position, but not an actual policy. During the Imperial regime, the OAU fully supported Ethiopia’s struggle for territorial integrity against Somalia’s irredentist expansion and Eritrea’s secessionist struggle. This often led to contradictions between Ethiopia’s principle-based commitment to the OAU and its own national interest, as well as the Emperor’s personal relations with Western powers like the USA and UK. This, according to Seyoum Haregot, one of the young Pan Africanist ministers who once served under Emperor Haile Selassie, led to “ambivalence in African foreign policy.” The ambivalence was due to the lack of a clear and communicable policy on the OAU. At the center of the contradiction was the incompatibility of defending the long-term national interest of Ethiopia in ensuring its territorial integrity against threats originating from Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and the Arab world, including Egypt, and long-standing diplomatic relations (including aid packages) with the USA, UK and Israel. Ethiopia paid dearly for its Pan-African solidarity support of the OAU’s decision against Israel’s occupation of Egyptian territory, the unilateral declaration of independence of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the preparation for independence of French Somaliland (Djibouti), and the Biafran civil war in Nigeria. Ethiopia’s position in support of OAU resolution to severe relation with Israel in 1994 emanated from its strong Pan Africanism. For the Derge, this was considered as almost socialist measure by imperial feudal regime.

Indirectly supporting Egypt monopoly on the Nile River waters, under the leadership of the US, the Western world denied Ethiopia access to international finance for Nile river development projects. Ultimately, Ethiopia’s ambivalent and contradictory attempts to pursue Pan Africanist goals while maintaining good relations with states that opposed many of those goals became unsustainable. Even though Ethiopia enjoyed positive diplomatic relations with states like the US and Israel that benefited Ethiopia’s economic development, the inevitable consequence of Pan Africanist solidarity during Emperor Haile Selassie last years was the severance of diplomatic ties and later on with Derge’s pro Soviet policy, Ethiopia discontinued economic aid and military cooperation with its traditional allies. By supporting the Pan-African OAU decisions, Ethiopia had attempted to appease what Seyoum Haregot calls “historical enemies of Ethiopia” and the communist bloc. Ultimately, Ethiopia achieved neither objective, and a socialist revolution ended the Imperial regime forever.

The last Ethiopian imperial government failed to anticipate and respond effectively the threats to territorial integrity and the likelihood of a communist takeover and failed to preserve its long-standing diplomatic relations with the western World. The protracted civil war in Eritrea
led to that state’s eventual secession from Ethiopia. Ethiopia became embroiled in a border war with Somalia, and the hostilities and tensions with Egypt continue to the present day.

2.2 1984 Socialist Foreign Policy
For nearly 80 years since institutionalized foreign diplomatic work, there was no written foreign policy document to guide Ethiopia’s foreign relationships and diplomatic interests and practices. The country’s diplomatic relations tended to be dependent on *ad hoc* practices and the whims of the personalities leading the various regimes. In 1984, during the Derge regime, the policy instruments the Ethiopian Foreign Policy Directives and Political Affairs. The foreign policy document that was kept in secrecy. This policy aimed to mitigate the animosity from neighboring countries and the Arab world on the one hand, and threats from the Western powers due to cold war ideological differences, on the other. Reflective of the hybrid sources of threats on geopolitical and ideological grounds, this foreign policy, like the domestic policy of Col Mengistu’s government, blended both ultra-nationalism and socialism as pillars of its foreign policy. Heavily influenced by socialist ideology, it was preoccupied with establishing robust diplomatic relations only with ideologically socialist countries and treating others as enemies. Other strategic objectives of the policy towards Africa and the OAU were to support the struggle against imperialism, feudalism and colonialism. Later on there were foreign policy related principles in the political documents of the only and ruling party. The National Democratic Revolutionary Program of the Worker’s Party of Ethiopia, and the Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia have focused rather in core principles related to foreign policy.

2.3 1991 Transitional Foreign Policy
In 1991, Ethiopia adopted its second foreign policy document, which included aspects of the Transitional Government Charter. With the collapse of the Soviet block and the demise of Derge, the 1991 Foreign Policy document overhauled the foundations of the previous 84 years of foreign policy. Amounting to a revolutionary change, the 1991 policy began to pivot Ethiopia’s foreign policy toward helping to correct domestic governance and the country’s political and economic policies. Official foreign policy also moved in the direction of peaceful neighborhoods and good relations with Arab countries as well as cooperative relations with Western countries. Far from being nationalist, socialist and anti-western, the 1991 foreign policy document reversed the hostile stance toward non-socialist countries as reflected in the previous document. Two major departures from the foreign policy and diplomatic practice of previous regimes were that Eritrea was actively supported in its referendum and intended secession from Ethiopia, and its ultra-nationalist policy pillar was replaced by a significantly diminished nationalist stance. For some Ethiopians, this was considered unpatriotic. Although formally short lived, the major fundamentals of the 1991 Transitional Foreign Policy have continued to influence current policies except on the ambivalent position about Eritrea since the 1998 aggression against Ethiopia.
Apart from the general focus of Pan Africanists on the twin imperatives of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles, the 1984 and 1991 policy instruments inadequately dedicated attention to the articulation of a substantive policy towards the OAU.

### 2.4 1996 Foreign Policy

The third policy document was prepared in November 1996. This policy was developed following the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia that details several foreign affairs related provisions and powers. More specifically, the Federal Constitution enumerates broad guiding principles that govern external relations. Article 86 lists core guiding principles include: "protection of national interest", "promotion of national interest in international agreements", "mutual respect for national sovereignty", "equality of states", "non-interference in the internal affairs of other states", and "peaceful solution of international disputes". More specifically, under Article 86 (4), foreign relations are "to observe international agreements which ensure respect for Ethiopia's sovereignty and are not contrary to the interests of its Peoples". Similarly, 86 (5) dictates that foreign relations of Ethiopia should aim "to forge and promote ever growing economic union and fraternal relations of Peoples with Ethiopia's neighbors and other African countries". Furthermore, 86(6) requires Ethiopian government "to seek and support peaceful solutions to international disputes". Similarly, Article 51 (8), Article 71 (3), Article 74 (6) and Article 77 (8) confer powers related to foreign policy to the Federal Government, the President, the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers.

Divided into eight sections and 347 articles, the 1996 foreign policy document was the first policy white paper to be made public. This document adopted many elements of the 1991 transitional foreign policy document and gave details about some of Ethiopia’s most important aspirant foreign relationships. The document also included chapters highly critical of the policies of previous regimes. Similar to the content of previous policies, only one rather bland paragraph outlined what Ethiopia wanted to achieve in its relations with the OAU. Article 249 reads: "Ethiopia needs to be an active member to help the OAU to realize its objectives." In comparison to the previous confidential documents, the 1996 Foreign Policy offers a clear position regarding the primacy of Ethiopia’s role in peace and security, as well as peace support missions in the IGAD region. Regional and continental meetings are given priority.

### 2.5 2002 Foreign Policy

Before the adoption of the current FANSPS, Ethiopia has implemented the 1996 FDRE Foreign Affairs Policy. The reform of OAU was clearly identified as Ethiopia priority in the 1996 Foreign Policy. However, no mention was made by neither the 1984 or 1996 policies regarding the benefits and responsibilities of Ethiopia as a host nation.

Adopted in 2002, the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) is by far the most elaborate and analytical foreign policy directive to date and to a limited extent on the responsibility attached to be a host nation. The main pillars of FANSPS are peace, development and democracy. The 2002 policy document notes that the country’s vulnerabilities
emanate mainly from internal threats of extreme poverty, structural injustice and discrimination. The most substantive statement about the OAU/AU in the FANSPS, reads:

"Ethiopia all along steadfastly championed the cause of Africa and Africans dating back to a time when it stood virtually alone. There has never been a time when Ethiopian governments shied away from taking up their responsibilities towards Africa. It can also be said that there was hardly any occasion when Ethiopia was refused political and diplomatic support from Africa when it was needed. This mutually beneficial relationship has continued with added vigor along similar lines after the adoption of Ethiopia's Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy."\(^{27}\)

However, while the main stance and message of this paragraph in the FANSPS is strong, it does not constitute a grand strategy as it lacks long-term intent and seems to be merely a subtle attempt to keep the OAU/AU from opposing Ethiopia's national interest.

In the FANSPS, the end state of Ethiopian policy on the AU was articulated as follows:

"As a founding member of the OAU, Ethiopia has struggled faithfully and prominently for the realization of the objectives of the OAU. ... In connection with this, Ethiopia has been receiving wide political and diplomatic support from the Organisation of African Unity and its member states. Recently, as evidenced when our country was invaded by (Eritrea), Africa firmly stood in support of the peace and security of Ethiopia, as in earlier times. In short, it can be said that there is hardly any political and diplomatic support that our country asked for and did not get from Africa. That Ethiopia is the seat of the African Union (AU) is a reflection of this fact. Naturally this entails that we carry a special responsibility for the organization (AU).... We wish to avoid any and all conflicts, and to respond to those who wish to launch conflicts against us by offering the possibility to resolve problems through discussion and political means. In this regard, we can count on the support of African countries and the African Union.... Furthermore, the influence and support we gain from Africa will help us indirectly as we try to make ourselves heard in other parts of the world. The African Union can play an important role in supporting our efforts in economic development and democratization, by contributing to the creation of favorable political conditions, including the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means."\(^{28}\)

Indicative of the minimalist policy position, FANSPS focuses on responding to threats and lacks adequate foresight and strategy for predicting, preventing vulnerabilities, seizing and creating opportunities. More critically, it fails to define and elaborate what constitutes the ‘special responsibility’ of Ethiopia to the AU.\(^{29}\) Thus, as it was before, Ethiopia's diplomatic endeavors related to the AU, and indirectly to the IGAD and the UN, intend only to avert threats and opposition to its policies against sources of potential threats, such as Eritrea and Somalia.
2.6 2016 Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) of Ministry of Foreign Affairs

More specifically to the AU, the 2016 Second GTP of Ministry of Foreign Affairs has dedicated a paragraph on the current situation in AU. It states that the AU needs strategic leadership from Member States, but at the same time the leading Member States of AU are in their own internal political crisis or violence. The instability in the South Africa’s ruling party African National Congress, the Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria, the leadership succession problem in Algeria have deflected the attention of the governments on AU by forcing them to focus on domestic affairs at the expense of strategic direction AU could have got from South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria.30 Despite not being mentioned in the Second GTP of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the same could be said about Ethiopia, Egypt, and Kenya, where internal political crises have limited their capacity to provide leadership to AU. What is more, the same document emphasizes on elections of the AU Commission leadership, forging common and united voice on international development and security issues; the accelerated implementation of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); by working with African countries exhibiting position similar to Ethiopia, promote the continental interest of Africa in partnerships that the AU concludes. In this regard, the Second GTP of Ministry of Foreign Affairs bestows special place for the implementation of the Agenda 2063 to which Ethiopia has made significant contribution in the drafting process. Second GTP of Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Agenda 2063 compatible with the Second GTP and Ethiopian fundamental developmental direction.31

Under the MoFA Second GTP, Strategic Goal two focuses on making the AU an effective “instrument for peace, development and integration”. This Strategic Goal focusing on AU, has four targets, and these are to:

1. engage AU Commission for our development and peace, and to actively participate in the all AU platforms by presenting proposal that facilitate the continental integration and peace, and to monitor their implementation;
2. forge common/joint positions on AU agenda with leading and influential AU Member States by creating a regular and successive consultative mechanisms;
3. conduct a public relations work within the Ethiopian population to instill strong Pan Africanism; and
4. play a leading role for Africa to hold a common position on fundamental and mutual continental interests, and to ensure Africa speaks in one voice in international forums.

Nonetheless, despite the absence of a fully-developed policy, throughout the past five decades Ethiopia’s commitment, overall direction and contributions toward the OAU/AU have been those of continuity and consistency. Ethiopia’s current primary areas of focus32 are the following:

1. accelerated implementation of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)- including mediation, peacekeeping, counter insurgency and terrorism;
2. leadership within IGAD - IGAD Chairmanship, South Sudan mediation, troop, financial and political contributions to the IGAD and AU, peace support operations, and Refugee Summits33
3. forging common and united voice on international development and security issues;
4. implementation of the Agenda 2063, such regional integration - aviation connectivity, hydroelectric supply, road and railway networks and cross border trade; 

5. capacity building; 

6. national image building; 

7. business and economic diplomacy; 

8. diaspora; 

9. human resource management, budget and finance, protocol services, consular services, study and research, situation room, information and communications, monitoring and evaluation; 

10. strategic partnerships, promotion of the continental interest of Africa in partnerships that the AU concludes by working with African countries exhibiting position similar to ours, and representation of Africa’s interests in global forums - such as Group-20, Group-8, climate change negotiations, Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), African partnership Forums with India and South Korea. Ethiopia is also active in the Africa-South America Summit, Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V), Afro-Arab Summit, and Annual AGOA Forum, and since 2017 in the UN Security Council.
3. Ethiopia’s Key Contributions to the OAU/AU

Ethiopia’s most prominent contributions to Pan Africanism and the OAU/AU can be categorized as follows:

Firstly, under Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopia’s ancient civilization and history of uninterrupted statehood and independence served as the seedbed from which the Pan-African solidarity movement drew inspiration, culminating in the creation of the OAU in 1963. Secondly, beginning in the early 1960s, Ethiopia extended enormous political and military support for various anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles in Africa. Such support included military training and material, and diplomatic support for liberation movements in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. This approach continued under Colonel Mengistu’s government. As the first independent, black African country to be a member of the League of Nations, and a founding member of the United Nations, Ethiopia promoted and defended the interests of Africa in various global forums of the League of Nations (LN), and subsequently the United Nations (UN). Together with Liberia, Ethiopia indicted South Africa’s Apartheid Government at the International Court of Justice over the question of the apartheid administration of Namibia (then, South West Africa).

Thirdly, since the early 1950s, Ethiopia has been one of the top troop-contributing African countries to UN and AU peacekeeping missions. With a total of 12,616 troops, including 4395 troops in the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and 8,221 assigned to other UN troop deployments for peace operations (Police 67, Military experts 100, troops 8,054), Ethiopia is effectively the biggest troop contributing nation in the world. As the third largest contributor to the UN Peacekeeping missions in Darfur-UNAMID (2462 troops), Abyei-UNISFA (4450 troops), South Sudan-UNMISS (1300 troops), MINUSTAH (8 Police) and MINUSMA (1 Staff officer), Ethiopia’s focus has been on the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. Entirely composed of Ethiopian troops, UNISFA in the disputed area of Abyei, is unique in the history of peacekeeping for a variety of reasons.

Fourthly, since the establishment of the OAU, with Emperor Haile Selassie serving as its first chairman, Ethiopia has been a trusted and successful peace broker, including during the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict (1963), and the civil wars in Biafra-Nigeria (1967-1970), Sudan (1993-2005) and Southern Sudan in Sudan (from 2013 ongoing). As the IGAD chairperson hosting the ongoing mediation efforts and supporting the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AU HIP), Ethiopia remains the leading mediator attempting to restore peace and stability to this troubled region.

Fifthly, Addis Ababa as the host of the Headquarters of the AU and the seat of various multilateral and bilateral foreign missions, delegations and institutions, is the unchallenged diplomatic hub of Africa. In addition to its assessed AU financial contributions (2017) of USD 8,205,000 million (4 percent of the AU’s total budget), Ethiopia is one of the few tier-two AU Member-States making timely and regular contributors to the AU. It has also provided land for new buildings (estimated at $282 million) and the old buildings where the AU complex is located, in
addition to all the human and physical facilities that the OAU/AU has needed since its earliest years.  

3.1 Ethiopia’s History as the Seedbed for Pan-African Solidarity

With one of the most ancient civilizations of the Aksumite Empire, Ethiopia is known for being one of the very few nations in the world that has never been colonized. In addition to its uninterrupted history of independent statehood, Ethiopia’s victory against repeated colonial invasions has given her an exceptional place in the history of Africa and the World and has contributed to a collective social psychology and sense of responsibility for the independence and promotion of Pan Africanism. Ethiopia’s defeat of Italy at the end of the 19th Century, at the Battle of Adwa, is one of the earliest examples of black African people defeating a white European colonial power (the 1879 Zulu defeat of the British in South Africa at Isandlwana is another). However, Ethiopia’s victory over the Italians was not only a victory of Ethiopians in defense of their country and territory. It was also not merely a triumph for the black race, but for all freedom loving people of all races. This unique historical legacy of Ethiopia inspired many famous African leaders, including Nelson Mandela, who in his famous autobiography ‘Long Walk to Freedom’ speaks affectionately of the Pan-African inspirational image and message he drew from the history of Ethiopia and its leader, Emperor Haile Selassie:

“Ethiopia has always held a special place in my own imagination and the prospect of visiting Ethiopia attracted me more strongly than a trip to France, England, and America combined. I felt I would be visiting my own genesis, unearthing the roots of what made me an African. Meeting His Highness, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, would be like shaking hands with history.”

Ethiopia under its emperors played a significant role in the establishment of the Pan African Conference (PAC), which took place in 1890.  In 1903, Ethiopia was asked to lead the World Black Movement. The PAC was the first western-based anti-colonial and pro-black forum. During World War II, the PAC argued against the invasion of Ethiopia by the Italian Fascist government. The PAC and its leaders petitioned and lobbied various governments and the League of Nations to maintain and defend the independence of Ethiopia as an independent sovereign country and potential haven for the entire black race. After the end of World War II, Emperor Haile Selassie and Dr. Peter Milliard of Guyana organized the PAC meeting in Manchester in 1945. The 1945 PAC meeting in Manchester, UK, unlike previous gatherings, drew many delegates to the meeting from the African continent who later became leaders of liberation movements and heads of state of newly independent black countries.

3.2 Era of Pan-African Solidarity: Anti-Colonial and Anti-Apartheid Struggle

Immediately after the Second World War, Ethiopia, with its historical legacy of independence and its military victory in the face of Italian colonial aggression under Emperor Haile Selassie, became the natural leader of the anti-colonial struggle and the Pan Africa solidarity movement.
Ethiopia’s early leadership role became well-established when on 4. November 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia took South Africa’s Apartheid government to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for its refusal to surrender its mandate over South West Africa (previously German West Africa and now Namibia). This action demonstrated Ethiopia’s commitment to the Pan-African movement that extended to a quest for international justice. Ethiopia also chaired the UN Decolonization Committee (Committee of 24) for three times.

In April 1963, Emperor Haile Selassie called on all colonial powers, including the governments of Britain, Portugal and the Apartheid government of South Africa, to grant self-determination to the people under their administration and control. He also asserted Ethiopia’s unreserved support for all African people under colonial administration and apartheid. In the same speech, Emperor Haile Selassie declared: "We extend our good will greetings to all our African brethren who are still under the yoke of foreign rule and wish that their struggle for freedom will bear fruit so that they would be masters of their own fate. Our help will also reach them." On his way to receive military training and attend a conference in Addis Ababa, Nelson Mandela boarded an Ethiopian Airlines flight in 1962 just a couple of months before his arrest in South Africa. His first passport was issued by Ethiopia. His visit to Ethiopia was an eye-opening moment for Mandela. For the first time, he was able to experience the reality of an independent black African nation with its own airline, its own black pilots and flight attendants, a black professional army and black state officials, all serving under the leadership of the famous black Emperor, Haile Selassie. Moreover, he wrote:

“We then changed flight to an Ethiopian Airways to Addis. Here I experienced a rather strange sensation. As I was boarding the plane I saw that the pilot was black. I had never seen a black pilot before... Once we were in the air, I started studying the geography of Ethiopia, thinking how Ethiopian guerrilla forces hid in these very forests to fight the Italian imperialists.... Here, for the first time in my life, I was witnessing black soldiers commanded by black generals applauded by black leaders who were all guests of a black Head of State. It was a heady moment. I only hoped it was a vision of what lay in the future for my own country.”

Despite the absence of a comprehensive long-term full-fledged foreign policy and the divergent views of two Ethiopian rulers, Emperor Haile Selassie and Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, about the country’s domestic policies, Ethiopia offered unreserved support, including diplomatic and military training, to many liberation leaders, including Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe.

3.3 Ethiopia’s Vital Role in the Adoption of the OAU Charter and the Establishment of the OAU

Many policy makers and scholars alike believe that without the vital initiative Ethiopia took, the OAU would not have been established in May 1963. The call for an all Africa inclusive conference, drafting the OAU charter and the personal interventions of Emperor Haile Selassie were critical for the establishment of the OAU. In 1957, the idea of organizing a meeting of
independent African states (at that time only eight) was discussed for the first time in London when the Prime Minister of the newly independent Republic of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, visited the Ethiopian Ambassador, Ammanuel Abraham, on the margins of the Commonwealth Ministerial Conference on the 1. July 1957. Ethiopia held the opinion that the aim of such a meeting should be more than a formal declaration leading to the establishment of a Pan-African organization. Ethiopia’s Ambassador in London at the time stressed the importance of internal consultations between independent states before any formal declaration and meeting. From August 1958, Ambassadors of Ghana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia, held several consultative meetings in preparation for the agreed agenda and date of the conference. A year later, on 15. April 1958 and after a series of consultations, Africa held its first Conference of Independent States in Accra, Ghana.\textsuperscript{51}

Despite being independent, these countries belonged to a variety of categories (e.g. language, religion, ethnicity, culture) and political groups, including the Monrovia States, the Brazzaville Group and the Casablanca Powers. With no colonial experience and led by its prominent Emperor (who received advice from a small group of young Ethiopian bureaucrats), Ethiopia served as a trusted home for all these groups and was invited to all their meetings.\textsuperscript{52} In spite of Hailie Selassie’s lingering personal qualms about what role to play and how to do so, his many speeches during those formative years articulated Ethiopia’s official stance toward Africa and its liberation struggle. Seiku Toure of Guinea and Emperor Haile-Selassie meeting in Addis Ababa in 1962 and their communique calling for All Africa Conference and lobbied for the same jointly.\textsuperscript{53}

Five years after the Accra Conference, Ethiopia called for and hosted the May 1963 Conference of African Heads of State that led to the establishment of the OAU. At the same conference, Emperor Haile Selassie pointed out that the various groupings of African states sowed seeds of division that needed to be undone by establishing the OAU:

“\textit{The commentators of 1963 speak, in discussing Africa, of the Monrovia States, the Brazzaville Group, the Casablanca Powers, of these and many more. Let us put an end to these terms. What we require is a single African Organization. An organization through which Africa’s single voice may be heard, within which Africa’s problems may be studied and resolved. We need an organization which will facilitate acceptable solutions to dispute among Africans and promote the study and adoption of measures for common defense and programmes for co-operation in the economic and social fields. Let us, at this Conference, create a single institution to which we will all belong, based on principles to which we all subscribe, confident that in its councils, our voices will carry their proper weight, secure in the knowledge that the decisions will be dictated by Africans and only by Africans and that they will take full account of all vital African consideration.}”\textsuperscript{54}
When presented with a draft of the OAU Charter, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs demanded that consideration of the draft Charter be adjourned. Regarding the critical intervention by the Emperor in the establishment of the OAU, Seyoum Haregot has noted:

“A stalemate developed on this issue. But when the heads of state arrived in Addis Ababa, the Emperor sprang into action. He convinced most of the heads of state that they should then and there agree to establish an inter-African body with a permanent administrative organization. He argued that, if these were delayed, unforeseen events could intervene and indefinitely prevent a united Africa. The progressive wing of African heads of state, including Nasser, Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita, Ben Bella, supported the Emperor.”

Stressing the purpose of the Conference, Emperor Haile Selassie succinctly pointed out that the “task on which we have embarked, the making of Africa will not wait. We must act to shape and mould the future and leave our imprint on events as they pass into history.” He added: “We are determined to create a union of Africans. In a very real sense, our continent is unmade; it still awaits its creation and its creators.” The OAU was established in Addis Ababa with thirty-two Independent African States. The establishment of the OAU in May 1963 in Addis Ababa was entirely accredited to the impeccable preparations, and above all the decisive interventions, of Emperor Haile Selassie. Dakar, Lagos, Kinshasa and Ethiopia were candidates to host OAU. Addis Ababa was selected to host the same, and Dialo Teli of Guinean proposed by Ethiopia was also appointed as the first Secretary General of OAU.

In 1963, Emperor Haile Selassie presciently defined the problems and questions that Africans were to address more than five decades after:

“But while we agree that the ultimate destiny of this continent lies in political union, we must at the same time recognize that the obstacles to be overcome in its achievement are at once numerous and formidable. Africa’s people did not emerge into liberty under uniform conditions. Africans maintain different political systems: our economies are diverse; our social orders are rooted in differing cultures and traditions. Further no clear consensus exists on the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of this union. Is it to be, in form, federal, confederal or unitary? Is the sovereignty of individual states to be reduced, and if so, by how much, and in what areas? On these and other questions there is no agreement, and if we wait for agreed answers generations hence, matters will be little advanced, while the debate still rages.”

The Emperor went on to explain the fundamental needs of institutions like the OAU. ”When a solid foundation is laid, if the mason is able and his materials are good, a strong house can be built”. Indeed, the OAU was not established on a solid foundation because independent African states were besieged by faults of their own making as well as those of colonial and other external forces. The rhetoric of Emperor Selassie and other leaders denied the logic of the link between domestic and foreign policy. During Africa’s era of lifelong leaders, most of the founding fathers of the OAU were externally progressive but at the same time domestically regressive in their approach to government. Indeed, with the exception of a few leaders of the liberation
struggle such as Nelson Mandela, most post-independence leaders became dictators. In this regard, Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, noted:

“Leaders of so-called freedom movements are typically not democratic personalities; they sustain themselves through years of exile and prison with visions of the transformation they will bring about once they seize power. Humility is rarely one of their attributes; if it were, they would not be revolutionaries. Installing a government that makes its leader dispensable—the essence of democracy—strikes most of them as a contradiction in terms. Leaders of independence struggle tend to be heroes, and heroes do not generally make comfortable companions.”

This mismatch between regressive internal governance, on the one hand, and progressive Pan-African solidarity on the other, sowed confusion among the generations that followed independence.

Eras do not end abruptly. They simply wither away over time. Thus, with the emergence of a new political climate and the failure of independent African states to democratize internally, the Pan-Africanist Era ended. Many of the founding fathers of Pan-Africanism, including Emperor Haile Selassie, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah, and Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella, were deposed or killed.

3.4 Era of Confusion and Division: The Cold War, Military Regimes and Ideology

With leaders like Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, General Said Barre, and General Mobuti SeseSeko, this was the era of military leaders. During the Cold War, Africa was a proxy for the strategic interests of the global superpowers (US and USSR). The resultant schism among African states that supported the West and those supporting the Soviet bloc made a Pan-African agenda and solidarity almost impossible. This unstable and uncertain situation ushered in the first period of violence to follow Africa’s hopeful but brief period of independence and Pan-African solidarity.

In the name of nation-building, Africa’s new military leaders installed dictatorships, following their various coups and revolutions. While the Western world conspired against independent minded leaders, often contaminated by Stalinist ideology, left-leaning leaders such as Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia used state power without any kind of cultural or institutional restraint. Leaders of this era unashamedly stole the sincere ideals of progressive members of the 1960s and 1970s generations, mainly of the leftist student movements, and exploited those ideals for their own personal power and gain. With no tolerance for any ideological differences whatsoever, different political groups of ideological camps tried to annihilate one another to control state power and impose their own will on all others. When confronted by public questions and opposition groups demanding freedom, they replied with brute force and built sophisticated machines of extreme violence against those opposed to them. A kind of violence that was alien to Africans was introduced by the generation of that era, and in turn more terror incapacitated the same generation. During this era, violations of human rights were endemic; minority groups
were deliberately and effectively destroyed. The rule of law was routinely disregarded and replaced by the rule of dictators; constitutions were reduced to mockery. Freedom and communism become something of a contradiction.

The regimes of this era had three cardinal failings: intolerance of any differing political views, the imposition of political ideas through extreme violence, and a self-serving leadership. The end result of this ‘era of confusion and division’ was destruction, blood and tears. Despondent of these outcomes, in less than two decades the leadership of that era abandoned ideology and left Africa in disarray. Indeed, despite their dictatorial dispositions of various degrees, some governments were less dictatorial than others. For instance, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Tanzania, Algeria, Morocco, Zambia as well as were led by populist governments. One positive attribute of these military leaders was, like their predecessors, that they supported the independence of African countries. It is during this era that Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and Zimbabwe that achieved their independence.

During this period, Ethiopia under the leadership of a military junta, the Derge led by Colonel Mengistu, played a much-limited role on the African political landscape. Pre-1974 foreign policy was dictated by urgency of ensuring independence through the principle of collective security in the League of Nations and later the UN, and reclaiming of territories, support to Israel and the Western ideology while keeping a measure of good relations with the socialist camp. In the beginning, Derge focused on non-aligned movement, adherence to the UN and OAU charters, anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movement, and friendly relations with Nile riparian and neighboring countries specifically mentioned Somalia and Kenya. The Derge period was known for ideologically driven foreign policy, with diplomacy reduced to ensuring territorial integrity in relation to Eritrea, and as a result averting the interference from Arab.

“Although its formulation has been clearly influenced by Marxists, concepts about the nature of society and alignment of forces in the world, there are elements of continuity as well as change, not least because Ethiopia has maintained its core values while playing an important role from time to time in the international arena long before the 1974 Revolution.”

With declaration of socialist ideology, during Derg’s time, the foreign relation was never “smooth and normal” as was during the Imperial time. The ideological of “proletarian internationalism overshadowed the basic tenets of the longstanding foreign policy of Non-Aligned Movement”, and this was a total departure from the Imperial policy with that exhibited inclination towards pro-western and Israel and territorial claims over Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti. Recognizing the end of the Cold War and the distortive impact on Ethiopia’s relation with other nations, the principle of proletarian internationalism was totally abandoned one year before the fall of Derge in March 1990.

Ethiopia was an active player in the game of ‘mutually assured destabilization’ with its neighbors. Consequently, Ethiopia under Colonel Mengistu was considered part of the problem in Africa, not a force for stabilization. Ideology and the Cold War contributed their share to the decline of Ethiopia’s African policy and therefore, its diminishing regional diplomatic influence.
However, fit also to its long-standing position and at the same time socialist ideology, Ethiopia supported the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements robustly. Nevertheless, Colonel Mengistu’s militaristic approaches, his dearth of intellectual competence in grasping the relevant global and internal dynamics, and a discernible lack of vision, deprived Ethiopia of the trust it once enjoyed among its peers under Emperor Haile Selassie. Under Colonel Mengistu, designing grand strategy relating to the OAU or any other policy matter was simply unthinkable for Ethiopia.

3.5 Era of Intervention and Integration: From OAU to AU
With the end of the Cold War, antagonistic global strategic interests of the world powers were withdrawn for a while. The withdrawal, even if short-lived, offered African leaders an opportunity to seek African solutions to a variety of African problems. Africa’s civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Central African Republic and Guinea Bissau; genocide in Rwanda; state failure in Somalia; and secessionist movements in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and other places became real challenges for the new and old African leadership, demanding urgent attention and action. African conflicts became more intra-state and less inter-state with localized manifestations and coverage, rather than civil wars that often engulf an entire country. As a result, Africa witnessed three times more internal displacement than refugees. The humanitarian crises in Somalia\(^67\) and Darfur\(^68\) were the worst, with more than six million deaths and forced displacements. To meet these challenges, the institutional transformation of the OAU to the AU began with the declaration of the OAU Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Governments in September 1999, in Sirte, Libya. Indicative of the purpose, the title and theme of the Summit, “strengthening OAU Capacity to enable it to meet the Challenges of the New Millennium,” was to amend the OAU Charter in order to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the OAU.\(^69\) This extraordinary summit, and later the AU Constitutive Act, shifted the mission and vision of the OAU, mainly from an organization of anti-colonial and anti-apartheid solidarity, to the more interventionist and integrationist AU.

Nonetheless, a striking characteristic of this Era of intervention and integration was the composition of the African leaders. The AU’s first summits were composed of long serving dictators, some of them since the struggle for independence such as Robert Mugabe, a new generation of rebel rulers that waged decades of protracted civil wars that toppled military dictators such as Yoweri Museveni, Meles Zenawi, and a few democratically elected leaders such as Thabo Mbeki. In this era while we have witnessed political struggles for extensions of constitutional terms of office and many elections marred by fraud and post-election disputes and violence, fragmented political parties and mandates, there have also been transitional grand coalitions governments and smooth transfers of power. Since the establishment of the AU, we have seen more than 35 countries exercise democratic elections in which half of them experienced a peaceful transfer of power by victorious opposition parties. With the 2011 North African uprisings, this generational progression has accelerated.\(^70\)
During this period, Ethiopia, under the leadership of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and current Prime Minister Hale Mariam Desalegn has continued to make significant contributions.

3.6 Ethiopia’s Contributions as Trusted Mediator and Peacekeeper

Ethiopia’s contributions to the mediation and peacekeeping missions began immediately with the establishment of the United Nations (UN). Under the auspices of Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopia’s mediation effort in 1963 with the Algeria-Morocco border conflict, and the civil wars in Biafra and Sudan were few examples. The unswerving commitment to UN peace keeping security has a strong historical pedigree in Ethiopia. During the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the 1930s, Emperor Haile Selassie called for the League of Nations to rescue Ethiopia from this invasion on the basis of the League’s principle of collective security. Giving a deaf ear to the pleas of Ethiopia, the League’s leading European countries failed even to properly deliberate the matter after the Emperor’s speech to the deliberative body of the League. In a very prophetic and farsighted manner, the Emperor pointed out that the League’s failure to keep the covenants of collective security of members when attacked by another member would break down the League and the world in peril. Haile Selassie also warned the League of Nations that failure to defend Ethiopia from the invasion by Italy would be the last nail in the coffin of the League. He said:

“It is not merely a question of a settlement in the matter of Italian aggression. It is a question of collective security; of the very existence of the League; of the trust placed by the States in international treaties; of the value of promise made to small states that their integrity and their independence shall be respected and assured. It is a choice between the principle of equality of States and the imposition upon small powers of the bonds of vassalage.”

Indeed, within a couple of years, Hitler and his ally, Mussolini, were waging war on Europe, and the League was no more. As a victim of continuous wars of unsuccessful invasion, Ethiopia genuinely sought a strong organization that would ensure equality and global security among states through collective security. Ethiopia’s active involvement as a founding member of the UN and later the OAU was entrenched in the deep-rooted belief in a fairer, more peaceful and more secure organisation of peace-seeking nations.

Borne out of this experience of victimization, its struggle to maintain its independence and to demonstrate its conviction in collective security, Ethiopia, as one of the founding members of the UN Charter, has been at the forefront of peace keeping efforts in Africa and beyond. Emperor Haile Selassie warned African leaders not to “rely solely on international morality. Africa’s control over her own affairs is dependent on the existence of appropriate military arrangements to assure this continent’s protection against such threats. While guarding our own independence, we must at the same time determine to live peacefully with all nations of the world.”

Common defense of Africa against any military aggression has been very important to Ethiopia, a country that had proposed and supported the establishment of a common defense force similar to the current AU Standby Force. Since the establishment of the UN and later the
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OAU/AU, Ethiopia has successfully participated in more than ten peacekeeping missions at continental and global level. Early on, beginning with the 1950s and 1960s, Ethiopia successfully participated in the UN peacekeeping missions in Korea and the Congo.

Recently, Ethiopia has also successfully participated in peacekeeping missions in Rwanda, Burundi and Liberia and is participating in Darfur, Somalia and South Sudan. Ethiopia’s peacekeepers have earned a continental and global reputation. With the AMISOM, UNISFA, and UNMISS, Ethiopia currently has over 12,000 troops participating in various UN and AU peace support operations. Ethiopia is currently the biggest troop contributing country in both Africa and the world. Ethiopia also served as a member of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) upon the formation of the AU in 2002.

Since the early 1990s, the IGAD has played and is currently playing a crucial role in the region’s mediation and peace processes, including peacekeeping in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Ethiopia was at the center of these initiatives, including the launching of a peace initiative on Sudan at the Addis Ababa summit of 7. September 1993. At this Summit, a Peace Committee comprising the heads of state of Eritrea, Uganda, and Kenya was established. The initiative issued the 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP) that aimed to identify the essential elements necessary for a just and comprehensive peace settlement in order to end the civil war in Sudan. In 2002, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) under the auspices of the AU and IGAD.

Ethiopia, through IGAD and bilaterally, contributed significantly in signing and implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In continuation of its role in the IGAD region, Ethiopia has served as the leading guarantor of the peaceful referendum and independence of South Sudan.

Currently, Ethiopia plays a crucial role in the maintenance of peace in the region by serving as balancing the power. Ethiopia serves as a trusted partner for peacekeeping in the border areas of Abyei in South Sudan and Sudan. Facilitated by Thabo Mbeki, Chief of the AU-High-level Implementation Panel, the Addis Agreement on Abyei was signed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) forces and the Government of Sudan (GoS) in Addis Ababa on 20. June 2011. The main objective of the Addis Agreement on Abyei is to ensure that this border area remains demilitarized until proper demarcation can be undertaken. The same agreement provided for the deployment of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission from Ethiopia. The UN Security Council Resolution 1990 authorized a United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Moreover, the Addis Ababa Agreement on Abyei expresses the trust Ethiopia enjoys from both the Sudanese parties in Khartoum and Juba.

UNISFA, composed of only 4250 Ethiopian troops, includes civilian police and is unique for many reasons. Unlike most peacekeeping missions in the World, UNISFA is entirely composed of Ethiopian troops. Ethiopian Generals serve as Force Commander and Head of Mission in
UNISFA and UNMISS. The deployment was very swift compared to other peacekeeping missions. Under normal circumstances, the deployment of peacekeeping missions takes a long time, as it requires the prompt cooperation of troop contributing countries, the mobilization of the resources required and their deployment. The support of the AU, UN and the IGAD for Ethiopia's offer and willingness to send its troops to Abyei indicates the international community's confidence in Ethiopian peacekeeping forces.

As part of its Pan African effort, Ethiopia played an indispensable role in determining the course for IGAD's regional historical legacy in mediation and peace support operations. Ethiopia has been at the center of regional diplomatic peace efforts, both in the past and currently. Since 2008, Ethiopia has been the chair of IGAD. Ethiopia has also been instrumental in the South Sudanese mediation effort since civil war broke out in the world's newest nation in December 2013. Ethiopia played a vital role in the peace process for South Sudan that led to the signing of a compromise agreement for a transitional government of national unity (TGoNU). Despite progress being slow, as the Chair of IGAD, Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn has hosted several rounds of negotiations between President Salva Kiir and his arch rival, former Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar, as well as other opposition leaders. It was commendable for Ethiopia to take the lead in dispatching a Ministerial Delegation to Juba on 19 December 2013, led by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Tedros Adhanom, only four days after the South Sudan conflict erupted. Ethiopia's longest serving Foreign Minister (1991-2008) Seyoum Mesfin served as IGAD's mandated Chief Negotiator, with the support of his two co-mediators from Kenya and Sudan. In this mediation process, Ethiopia has counter-balanced Uganda's unilateral actions and serves as an important force for stability in the region, thereby preventing regional war in the Horn of Africa. Currently, Ethiopia, as Chair of IGAD, is leading the High-Level Revitalization process for South Sudan's peace process.

Ethiopia's humanitarian responsibility to grant asylum to hundreds of thousands of refugees from 19 countries, but mostly from South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea, has now resulted in sanctuary for more than 830,000 refugees.75

On the economic front, Ethiopia has been inspirational in the delivery of pro-poor developmental services and equitable and fair use of natural resources (the Nile Basin Initiative). According to UNDP and the IMF, Ethiopia has reduced poverty at an accelerated rate and will continue to do so. In 2015/2016, the poverty rate stood at 23.5 percent of which one percent (close to one million people) were lifted out of poverty.77 Despite the current political protests, the IMF forecasts that Ethiopia will remain one of the world's fastest growing economies for the next couple of decades.78

Ethiopia has placed renewed stress on regional integration within IGAD through infrastructure development schemes, as well as the export of hydroelectric power.79 Ethiopia has committed extensive public investment to 13 transport corridors passing through Ethiopia to Kenya, Somaliland, Sudan, South Sudan and Djibouti. Infrastructural development places the integrationist agenda of IGAD on sound economic fundamentals. Once completed, these infrastructural
projects will be a more sustainable means of integration, as they do not depend heavily on top-down state initiatives. They could also have a positive multiplier impact on the social development of local communities along their routes and enable public services including law and order, security to effectively reach the borderlands. People, skills and capital follow investment, transportation and communication infrastructure, while the mobility of people, goods and services also helps to foster integrative opportunities.

In the education sector, Ethiopia was the first country to propose the establishment of a Pan African institution of higher learning and also offered to host it, an idea that was only revived again and became operational after five decades during the AU Kampala Summit in 2010. Since 1958, as part of its Pan African initiatives, Ethiopia has been awarding scholarship to many deserving Africans. In May 25, 1963, Ethiopia suggested that,

> “serious consideration...be given to the establishment of an African University, sponsored by all African States, where future leaders of Africa will be trained in an atmosphere of continental brotherhood. In this African institution, the supra-national aspects of African life would be emphasized, and study would be directed toward the ultimate goal of complete African Unity. Ethiopia stands prepared here and now to decide on the site of the University and to fix the financial contributions to be made to it.”

In the past decade, various Ethiopian universities, including Addis Ababa University, have established several institutes that offer courses on Pan African, continental and regional issues, including the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Institute for Federal Studies, African Center for Disaster Risk Management and a number of other similar institutions.

More than 2603 foreigners and refugees from various African countries (1753 from Eritrea, 586 from Somalia/Somaliland/Puntland, 134 from South Sudan, 110 from Sudan, 10 from Yemen and 10 from the Great Lakes region) are registered in Ethiopia’s public universities and enrolled in these courses. Most of them have either been offered scholarships or are self-sponsored in tertiary institutions throughout the country. Significant numbers of these students are funded by the GoE.

3.7 Ethio-Eritrean War: the trigger for Ethiopia’s proactive Pan-African diplomacy

Neglected for almost a decade, the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean border war brought a significant awakening to Ethiopia’s diplomacy, particularly its Pan African diplomacy. Before this awakening, the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean border war, foreign policy and diplomacy, except for trade and commercial interests, was totally neglected. Ethiopia was completely and deliberately consumed by internal developmental and political challenges. Ethiopia only advanced its diplomacy with great powers such as the USA, EU, and China, to support its economic developmental ambitions. In contrast, its Pan African diplomacy remained subdued apart from participation in peace keeping missions at the behest of the UN or AU. Following its change of government in 1991, it was only after 1998 that Ethiopia emerged as a major voice and pivotal state on the African landscape.
Ethiopia suddenly sprang into diplomatic action with the Eritrean invasion of Ethiopia in May 1998. This awakening was not the result of a grand strategy by design, focusing on relations with the AU, but as a diplomatic extension of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean border war to counter Eritrea’s aggression on that front. During the regimes of Emperor Haile Selassie and Col Mengistu, Ethiopia’s diplomacy focused on territorial integrity (under threat by Eritrea) and access to the sea (lost to Eritrea in 1992), as well as the fight against insurgent groups supported by Somalia.

Eventually Ethiopia came out as a winner of the border war with Eritrea. In 1999-2000, the Ethiopian troops crashed the last stronghold of Eritrean forces in Badme and penetrated deep inside Eritrean territory. This forced the Eritrean regime to seek a diplomatic solution as their military defeat was almost certain. Ethiopia halted its advance, announced a ceasefire and declared its readiness to settle the dispute through dialogue. Finally, the two countries signed the AU and UN-brokered peace deal which ended two years of bloodshed.

Nonetheless, as the causes of the conflict were never fully addressed, both countries soon became engaged in a proxy war through lending support to rebel groups in each country. The Eritrean invasion of Ethiopia in May 1998 and the diplomatic war that ensued, triggered Ethiopia’s march toward diplomatic dominance in the IGAD region and beyond. In addition to the war with Eritrea, the 2005 competitive national election in Ethiopia and the violence that followed, as well as its 2006 intervention in Somalia, significantly increased the size of Ethiopia’s diplomatic footprint in the region. Ethiopia’s increased role in IGAD, the AU and the UN as well as at the global level was further evidence of Ethiopia’s enhanced diplomatic presence. Another significant target for Ethiopia’s Pan African diplomacy has been the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia was able to gain Pan African support within the NBI through its multilateral approach, rule-bound diplomacy, and empathy toward all riparian populations, as well as its strong support for the principle of fair and equitable water sharing. Ethiopia was therefore able to rally the upper riparian countries of the Nile to join together in opposing the unfair colonial agreements on Nile water usage. Ethiopia’s approach led to the eventual signing by many riparian countries of the Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA). Beyond changes to the normative framework, Ethiopia has also successfully managed to transform the views of NBI countries through the GERD.

3.8 Fear of Being Considered a Regional Hegemon: The Benefits of Being Underestimated

The ideas about, and terms used to describe, the roles of countries in their respective regions in Africa has been an issue of intense debate and disagreement. These terms include “core state”, “regional power”, “key regional actor”, “regional anchor state”, “key player” and “pivotal state”. Ethiopia rarely officially claims to be the dominant or most influential state in the region and resists being regarded as a ‘regional hegemon’. Ethiopia certainly does not want to be seen as a regional hegemon or an unpopular military and economic bully. Indeed, the line between being a key regional player and the dominant regional power or regional hegemon is very thin. Thus, in terms of nomenclature, ‘core state’, ‘key regional actor’, ‘regional anchor state’, ‘key player’ and ‘pivotal state’ have more limited and less threatening connotations than ‘hegemon,’
'regional power' or 'leading country'. Having a grand strategy may also be considered an extension of a state’s ambition to exercise supreme regional powers and influence. As a result of its inward looking foreign policy, Ethiopia has deliberately sought to underplay its image and over-perform in terms of actual national transformation and regional diplomacy. This is by no means a new strategy, certainly not in Asia, where, for example, China’s economic performance was vastly underestimated before it decided to go global. China officially describes itself as a third world developing country. Perhaps Ethiopia's major reason for deliberately understating itself has been to avoid attracting unnecessary attention, animosity and responsibility in the region. Aiming to keep ultra-nationalist posturing at home, Ethiopia has underplayed its role in the region and beyond. Due to the hazards of being labelled as a hegemon, in the early years of the AMISOM (2007-2011), when it begun as IGASOM in conceptual preparatory form, IGAD, at the behest of Ethiopia, rightly decided that frontline countries should not contribute troops to AMISOM to avoid conflicts of interest between nation re-building and national interests in Somalia. Uganda, Burundi, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone as the main contributors to the total compliment of AMISOM, which ultimately reached troop levels of 17,700. It was when the TFG was threatened by the UIC, and Jihad was declared against Ethiopia, that the armed forces of Ethiopia intervened, creating buffer zones controlled by local militia. Since 22. January 2014, following UNSC Resolution 2124, and after IGAD reversed its decision to preclude frontier countries from contributing troops to AMISOM, 4395 Ethiopian troops have been re-hatted as AMISOM peace keepers.
4. Approaches of Other Significant African States toward the AU

Countries like South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Ethiopia are among those African states that can significantly affect the state of affairs of the continent. If they perform well, they can lead their specific regions to greater success, when they are in crisis, their regions will also suffer. Following the two cases of South Africa and Nigeria are described more in detail.

Arguably, the Republic of South Africa has the most substantive policy and strategy toward the AU and Africa in general. African solidarity and support (diplomatic and military) for the struggle against Apartheid has been used as the basis for South Africa’s Pan-African stance towards Africa and the AU. South Africa is among the four leading financial contributors to the AU (each contributing 12 percent, USD 16.2 million).\textsuperscript{86} South Africa’s 2011 Foreign Policy White Paper has emphasized the importance of Africa and the AU in advancing the country’s influence at the continental level.\textsuperscript{87}

Chris Landsberg summarizes four major goals of South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa.\textsuperscript{88} These are: First, strengthening the African Union and its structures, including supporting the harmonization and rationalization of RECs, supporting the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), establishing AU financial institutions, engaging with the African Diaspora, and implementing the AU Gender declaration, and African Peer Review Mechanism; and advancing NEPAD and its integration with AU and SADC processes, as well as at national level throughout the continent. Second, contribute towards SADC, notably its governance and program implementation. Third, contribute to peace, security and stability, the African Standby Force, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and Côte d’Ivoire. Also, contribute to the support of stabilization efforts in Western Sahara.

South Africa’s role in the SADC region is also commendable. It has contributed its fair share in resolving political disputes in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, the DRC and Zambia. The country is also among the few countries on the continent to have a ruling party that is capable and willing to engage in regular debates on the Pan African agenda, including in its national parliament. At the same time, the rationality and Pan African commitment of South Africa, particularly during the term of office of the current President, Jacob Zuma, has been put into question. The controversial decisions with regard to Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the South Sudanese crisis, and more importantly South Africa’s violation of customary rules on the ineligibility of its nationals to compete for the Chairpersonship of the AUC. Through South Africa’s aggressive campaign, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was elected to take the helm at the AU as AUC Chairperson in 2012. South Africa’s interest in playing a dominant role at the AU level was made very clear, even at the expense of creating some disharmony with other AU key member states including Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{89}

In the case of Libya’s 2011 uprising and the role of the International Criminal Court, Pretoria had promoted multiple positions in Addis Ababa at the AU, New York at the UN and in Pretoria. South Africa’s stance exposed it to accusations of supporting a ruthless dictator in Libya
(reportedly a financier of South Africa’s ruling political party, the ANC), and a fraudulent out-going president in Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, when Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir visited South Africa in June 2015, authorities failed to arrest and surrender him to the ICC. Two years later, after fully investigating the matter, Judge Cuno Tarfusser of the ICC reprimanded South Africa for its failure to do so. More essentially, during the Côte d’Ivoire election crisis, South Africa moved one of its naval vessels to the Gulf of Guinea, even though it refused to contribute to the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Similarly, its insignificant contribution to AMISOM, and failure to actively participate in the fundraising effort to address the Horn of Africa drought in 2010, indicated serious weaknesses in its Pan African leadership ambitions.

Furthermore, South Africa was also criticized for its unquestioned support of Eritrea’s positions in the Horn of Africa. South Africa was also criticized for attempting to undermine an IGAD-led South Sudan mediation effort by bringing a parallel negotiation team to Arusha together with Tanzania. These actions have all compounded questions about the competence of the current South African government to play an effective diplomatic role in Africa.

Nigeria’s first Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1960-1966), was instrumental in setting Nigeria’s Pan African agenda. Right from the beginning, he included the Pan African agenda in Nigeria’s foreign policy. In his parliamentary speech on 30th August 1960, Balewa famously said: “Very particular attention will be devoted to adopting clear and practical policies with regard to Africa. We shall make every effort to find a way to unite our efforts and prevent Africa from becoming an area of crisis and world tension”. This was further expounded by the Prime Minister in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 7th October 1960, which laid the foundation of Nigeria’s future foreign policy. The main thrust of that address included, among other elements: a) the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; b) respect for existing boundaries which must, in the interest of peace in Africa, remain the recognized boundaries until such a time as the peoples concerned decide of their own free will to merge into one unit or redraw boundaries; c) peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation and arbitration; d) equality of States, no matter their size, population, military or economic might; and e) promotion of functional cooperation throughout Africa. Veteran Ambassadors, Olusegun Ashiru and Olufemi George argue that this pronouncement laid the basis of Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust from 1960 till the present time. Successive administrations, whether "civilian or military, have doggedly kept to this foreign policy agenda, especially as it concerns Africa, which has remained the centerpiece of our foreign policy". Similarly, more than five decades on, these principles remain the bedrock of AU policy. President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) played instrumental role in transformation the OAU into the AU in 2002. He also played a key role in mediating the unwarranted and impractical attempt by the former Libyan dictator, Muammar Ghaddafi, to immediately establish a United States of Africa. Working closely with the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, and President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, President Obasanjo, was among key players on African continental issues."
Ethiopia’s role in and towards the AU has been equally significant and similar to the one of Nigeria and South Africa. Nonetheless, Ethiopia’s approach to the AU differs from other key regional players such as Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, and Algeria in many ways. First, historically, Ethiopia has been at the leading edge of almost all Pan African initiatives due to its independence, uninterrupted statehood and popular leaders. Nigeria, and Algeria played important roles in the Pan African movements against colonialism and apartheid. South Africa, joined the Pan African movement much later than Ethiopia and still faces some serious challenges in articulating a mature Pan African policy and practice. Egypt’s focus was always to become the undisputed Pan Arab leader and it was only in recent years that it came to realize that it had been neglecting its African roots and needed to focus more on its Southern neighborhood.
5. Addis Ababa: as headquarters of the OAU/AU

Since May 1963 (statutorily since July 1964), Addis Ababa has served as the Headquarters of the OAU. In the earliest times of the OAU, Ethiopia provided not only land and buildings for the AU in Addis Ababa, but also offered all the human and physical resources that the OAU required. In 1963, Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) and in the early years of the AU, Senegal and later, Libya under late Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, attempted to move the seat of the OAU/AU from Addis Ababa. When Colonel Qaddafi failed to move the Headquarters to his hometown of Sirte, he wanted to make Sirte the *de facto* seat of the AU by building brand new facilities. The sudden metamorphosis of Colonel Qaddafi from a leading promoter of Arab unity to a primary advocate and financier of the United States of Africa could only be explained by his frustration with the League of Arab States and his personal ambition to become the primary leader of first the Arab and later the African region. To make effective use of African political platforms to serve his private interests, he lavished cash on the AU and some African leaders. He built mosques and hotels in many African countries. Libya, like South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria, financially contributed not only 15 percent (USD 16 million) of the budget of the AU, but also covered the expenses of many smaller and poorer African countries and funded many AU events including ordinary and extra-ordinary AU Summits. The AU Constitutive Act and rules governing the hosting of AU summits designated Addis Ababa as the headquarters of the AU, and the agreed center which hosts the January/February summit every year. However, individual member states could apply to the AU summit to allow them to host the June/July summit. The rotation of the June/July summit was originally devised to reduce the pressure from Colonel Qaddafi due to his request to host AU summits. It was also a compromise deal to have two summits per annum and the rotation of the June/July to allow all AU member states to host summits. Col Qaddafi’s conversion from being the aspirational leader of Pan Arabism to his support for Pan Africanism was not taken at face value. His history of destructive interventions in many African countries, including his support for the brutal Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, his 1980 intervention in Chad, his support for rebel groups in Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Niger, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Liberia were not forgotten by many leaders. His near ‘hallucination’ project of establishing armed forces of the United States of Africa, composed of mainly Libyan soldiers, and his impracticable integration agenda, in addition to his limitless personal interests and dictatorial credentials, were rejected by key leaders in Africa including the late Meles Zenawi, and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. To thwart Colonel Qaddafi’s unrealistic and often destabilizing plans, Ethiopia with Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda formed a bulwark of opposition against his divisive initiatives. While Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo acted as a diplomatic intermediary, the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni formed a wall of resistance against Colonel Qaddafi. Dancing to the tune of Libyan dinars, some leaders such as Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal voted in support of the proposals forwarded by Colonel Qaddafi while failing to ratify any of the AU
treaties that require minimal action for integration. Prime Minister Meles and President Museveni remained at the forefront of this bloc against Qaddafi when Mr. Obasanjo and Mr. Mbeki left office.

With mounting opposition from key African leaders to Col Qaddafi’s grandstanding mounted, he became increasingly abrasive and disruptive. Indeed, some argue that Colonel Qaddafi overtly sought the division of Nigeria into three parts; covertly supported the toppling of Thabo Mbeki by the current President of South Africa Jacob Zuma; funded the 2009 riots in Buganda; and organized the 2008 incursions of the Justice and Equality Movement into Khartoum. When his grand plan for making Sirte the capital of the AU and establishing a United States of Africa under his leadership failed, Colonel Qaddafi established and funded the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) that grew to include a bloc of 28 African states, and appointed his close confidant, Mr. Mohamed al-Madani al-Azhari, (in prison until recently in Libya) to oversee it. Designed to serve as an alternative means of achieving his grand plan, CEN-SAD like his other initiatives was used to blackmail and intimidate African countries. Although, several times, he invited Ethiopia and Uganda to join, they were the only two IGAD member states that refused to join CEN-SAD.

During the uprisings in Libya, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan, took the most progressive positions that espoused the core principles of the AU in support of the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people. The late Prime Minister Meles made clear Ethiopia’s position by advocating the end of Colonel Qaddafi’s regime. The Republic of Sudan went further by sending its troops and military support to the NTC (National Transitional Council). In a long debate at the AU Summit in Malabo in July 2011, current South African President Jacob Zuma and other countries, mainly advocating the need to forge a common African voice against external intervention by NATO in Libya, vehemently opposed Ethiopia’s position. While the AU led by South Africa decided not to recognize the NTC, even after Colonel Qaddafi left Tripoli, Ethiopia and Nigeria issued a joint communiqué in support of the recognition of the NTC.

With the death of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, the fate of establishing a United States of Africa in the near term appears to have fizzled and died. Colonel Qaddafi was the main proponent of the immediate establishment of African integration out of personal reasons. One can expect a better opportunity for more somber and realistic leadership in delivering the promises of the AU. As one of the authors argued in a piece published by the Institute for Security Studies in 2011,

“[w]ithout a doubt, the foreign policy and relations of the NTC and the future elected Libyan government will be different from that of Gaddafi. Firstly, Gaddafi’s foreign policy in Africa stems from his individualistic interest to lead a United States of Africa—a project in which he has heavily, but unsuccessfully, invested on for the last decade. Libya was too small a territory and population for ‘the Brother Leader’. He needed a much bigger territory and population to lead. For the current government, and presumably for the next elected government, Libya will still be a challenge to govern, given that some of the clans may think of establishing their own ‘emirates’: That is the reason why the AU is concerned about the territorial integrity of Libya.”98
With the absence of Colonel Qaddafi from AU summits, proponents of gradual integration, such as the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (based on realistic and wise considerations of the absence of the complimentary economic drivers and huge political barriers for immediate integration on the ground), have gained the upper hand in the debate.

A number of state institutions are involved in formulating proposals for decisions with regard to Ethiopia’s positions on AU matters. Institutionally, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Office of the Permanent Representative to the AU, lead guide and formulate policies and decisions with regard to the AU. The Prime Minister elaborates positions on AU issues in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sector ministries.

Obviously, the Ethiopian Permanent Mission to the AU has an important role in making day-to-day decisions. The Ethiopian Mission to the AU is constituted as a department in the MoFA, thus channeling its liaison functions with the AU through the Ministry. However, the Mission seeks regular guidance for important decisions from the State Minister for Political Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Prime Minister. The Mission also consults with experienced veteran diplomats on a variety of issues.99
6. Experience of other Host Nations

In the following chapter the cases of other host nations are described more in detail with cases of Brussel and New York as well as Nairobi and Geneva.

Belgium is a good example regarding the practices of a nation hosting an extensive regional multilateral organization such as the EU, which was used as a model for the AU to replicate. Although Belgium is a marginal player in the EU, it has a clear standalone policy toward the EU and its European institutions. Belgium’s policy towards the EU is divided into ten areas. These are freedom, security and justice; socio-economic and financial governance; the internal market; climate and energy; environment and health; agriculture and fisheries; trade policy; external relations; treaties, institutions and European political projects; and transportation. For each of these sectors, Belgium’s policy offers detailed objectives of what the country aspires to achieve within the EU. The policy is designed considering Brussel’s position in the EU as the seat of Pan European institutions. It aims to boost Belgium’s role and influence on international politics and diplomacy.\footnote{100}

Belgium’s detailed Host Nation Policy (HNP) was adopted on 12th September 1997 and revised in 2006. Belgium has a European Policy that is "defined through more than 250 coordination meetings a year". The HNP is the proactive national strategy that "aims at strengthening the attractive position of Belgium as the host country for International Organization", governing Belgium’s responsibility towards "international governmental organizations which have Headquarters or representation (mission, liaison office…) in Belgium, in order to have them feel welcome and valued." At the center of these international organizations are the EU and European institutions, NATO and others.\footnote{101}

The HNP further offers details of the competencies of various tiers of Belgian governmental authorities at federal, regional and city levels. HNP has two major parts: first, the "compliance of Belgium, as a host nation, with its obligations towards international organizations on its territory under international law, i.e. the granting of privileges and immunities; and second "all actions which besides and above the granting and implementation of privileges and immunities, contribute to make Belgium more attractive for international organizations to establish their Headquarters".\footnote{102}

As part of Belgian Foreign Policy, the consultations of the HNP are coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while decisions are implemented by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the HNP. With an officially allocated budget, the Inter-Ministerial Committee serves as the focal point for host nation affairs under the Prime Minister. Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate-General for Coordination and European Affairs is responsible for Belgium’s European policy.

With a Chairperson and four staff members, the Inter-Ministerial Committee serves as a collaborative framework, and is mandated to ensure coherence in the implementation of the HNP with overall hospitality toward international organizations. It also coordinates positions and roles of all tiers of the Belgian government at federal and regional levels; promptly identify new
problems which could arise between Belgium and international organizations and formulate solutions; develop new initiatives in accordance with the HNP for the consideration by the Belgian government. The Inter-Ministerial Committee also serves as the helpdesk for security-related problems affecting international organizations and their staff members.

Indicative of the high regard and importance given to the responsibility of a hosting nation, the Chair of the Inter-Ministerial Committee is appointed by royal decree, after deliberation and nomination of a candidate by the Federal Cabinet. Reporting to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chair has all the required authority to consult, coordinate, represent concerned ministries and public service authorities and Belgium when dealing and negotiate host country agreements with international organizations. The chair also can request public service authorities to study and take relevant measures on particular issues.

In term of its role in the establishment and hosting of the UN, the United States is to the UN what Ethiopia is to the AU. Thus, the US is a good case to study regarding the complex responsibilities of nations hosting multilateral organizations such as the UN and AU.

A leading founding member of the UN, the US played a critical role in the establishment of the UN and its predecessor, the League of Nations, as did Ethiopia in the formation of the OAU and the AU. The name 'United Nations' was itself coined by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and was first used in the Declaration by the United Nations of 1st January 1942, during the Second World War, when 26 nations pledged their Governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers. Although Ethiopia was not among the 26 original UN Declaration signatories, it was among the subsequent adherents to the document. When President Roosevelt met with Joseph Stalin in Tehran, Iran, in 1943, he proposed an international organization comprising an assembly of all member states and a 10-member executive committee to discuss social and economic issues. The United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and (pre-Communist) China would enforce peace as "the four policemen." From April-June 1945, representatives of 50 nations met in San Francisco to complete the charter. According to the text on the State Department’s official website, Roosevelt sought to convince the public that an international organization was the best means to prevent future wars. The Senate approved the UN Charter on July 28, 1945, by a vote of 89 to 2. The United Nations came into existence on October 24, 1945, after 29 nations had ratified the Charter. 103

The decision on the seat for the UN Headquarters was divisive. Joshua Keating, in his writing entitled ‘Why is the UN in New York anyway’, the two proposed seats for the UN that were debated in 1945: European and US seat. He wrote: "when a vote on the location of the headquarters was taken in London in 1945, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Canada voted for a European headquarters. The rest, from Latin America (Brazil, Chile, and Mexico), the smaller nations of Europe (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), the Pacific (Australia and China), the Soviet Union, and Iran voted for a new start for the new organization, in the United States". Keating argues that “the Soviets were enthusiastic backers of the plan as they wanted to avoid the scenario of the UN headquarters in Europe might counter their plans for expansion.”104
After more than 70 years, currently, the UN has 193-member countries, working on six continents. The US is, by far the largest funder of UN projects. In 2016, 22 percent of the UN budget and 28 percent of the peacekeeping budget came from the US only.\textsuperscript{105} China contributes the second highest amount, covering 10.25% of the total amount of the UN’s Budget, followed by Japan (9.68%), Germany (6.39%), France (6.28%) and the UK (5.77%).\textsuperscript{106}

The US and UN are both regularly criticized for their often-turbulent relations. Some claim that the UN is a tool of the US. During the UN General Assembly, heads of states such as Fidel Castro of Cuba, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad of Iran, and Col Gaddafi of Libya, fiercely criticized the UN for not standing against the US and its allies. Even in our sub-region, Eritrea has been levelling the same accusation at the UN and the US. The UN’s successive sanctions against Eritrea and the refusal of the US to grant a visa to its leader, Isaias Afewerki, to attend the UN General Assembly, have been cited as examples of the unhealthy relations between the UN and US.

Nonetheless, the US and the UN mostly enjoy a good relationship, despite those few occasions when the relationship hits rock bottom. When the US sometimes totally rejects UN decisions on critical global peace and security issues, it effectively undermines the UN while at the same time hosting it. In 2000, the then Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, said in a speech to the UN Security Council that no institution, be it the Security Council or the ICC, is competent to judge the foreign policy and national security decisions of the United States. The US has also been selective in assuming international commitments to the UN. It has on some occasions, even retreated from past commitments to the UN. In December 2001, the US retreated from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which allowed it to go ahead with its own missile defense system, thereby setting the stage for American Unilateralism. The US also refused to be subject to the jurisdiction of international legal bodies like the International Criminal Court (ICC) and refrained from embracing key human rights regimes with the United Nations, despite its support for the international rule of law. In addition, the US is one of only two countries that have not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and one of very few that have not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.\textsuperscript{107} In recent history, the US and UN system clashed on the US invasion of Iraq, the Paris climate change agreement\textsuperscript{108}, the rejection of Salam Fayad as the UN nominee for the role of peace envoy to Libya\textsuperscript{109} and the termination of its membership in UNESCO.\textsuperscript{110}

The UN Committee on Relations with the Host Country (US), and the US Permanent Mission to the UN, under the Department of State govern the issues of the host nation. Established in 1971, the UN Committee on Relations with the Host Country has nineteen members including USA as permanent member. Meeting every two months, all UN Member States may participate in the work of the Committee as observers, but only members may vote.\textsuperscript{111} Similarly, the AU has a Sub-Committee of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) on Headquarters and Host Agreements, and despite requests from Ethiopia, the Sub Committee did not allow Ethiopia to join citing conflict of interest.\textsuperscript{112} However, this is not only supported in practice elsewhere, it is also unreasonable given that the Membership actually may facilitate the speedy resolution of issues arising the host nation.
The US Permanent Mission to the UN has an Office of Host Country Affairs that directly and specifically deals with host nation issues. The US Permanent Mission liaises with the UN Committee on Relations with the Host Country. The Office of Host Country Affairs liaises between the UN community on the one hand and the US federal and local government agencies, businesses and private citizens on the other. It also deals with a myriad of host nation facilitation duties including diplomatic airport arrivals and departures, aircraft departures and landing clearances; employment authorization, legal assistance, parking and other municipal or local issues; security, safety, and law enforcement coordination, treaty obligations, and the UN Committee on Relations with the Host Country, as well as visa services for diplomats.\(^{113}\)

The AUC and UNECA and other international organizations need also to ensure that the legitimate interest of Ethiopia are fully respected. The treatment, privileges and immunities the staff members of the AU and UN agencies enjoy should not be less than those offered in host nations such as in New York (USA), Geneva (Switzerland), Brussels (Belgium). At the same time, AU and UN and other agencies hosted in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) should neither demand (nor be conferred) than those offered in the above mentioned diplomatic hubs. The various problems related to implementation, discrepancies in interpretation, and lacunas in the various fragmented documents will also be addressed through a comprehensive host country agreement. The idea of establishing a Host Country Liaison Office within the premises of the African Union Headquarters to facilitate resolution of issues related to the implementation of the Headquarters Agreement may for the time being a solution.\(^{114}\)

In Kenya, as host of many UN institutions, the Kenyan Foreign Affairs Ministry deals with UN Offices such as the United Nations Program on the Environment (UNEP), the United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-Habitat) and the UN Office in Nairobi (UNON). The latter is constituted as a specialized institution with a strong mandate and direct working relations with various Kenyan government institutions (not limited only to the Foreign Affairs Ministry) including ministries of the Environment and Mineral Resources, and Housing.\(^{115}\) As the host of the EU headquarters and UN Mission respectively, Belgium and Switzerland also have their separate missions (operating from their embassies) in Brussels\(^{116}\) and Geneva.\(^{117}\) These missions are not attached to their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and are responsible for their own logistics, budgets and staff remuneration.

Furthermore, many European countries, including Belgium, the UK, Germany and France have a Deputy/State Minister in charge of European Affairs (EU). Similarly, some African countries have a Minister of Foreign Affairs or a separate Minister of Regional Integration and AU Affairs.
7. Addis Ababa’s Special Responsibility to the AU

As FANSPS elaborates, Ethiopia’s opportunity to host the AU comes with "a special responsibility for the organization". Nonetheless, what constitutes ‘special responsibility’ is not defined in the FANSPS or any other policy document. Ethiopia regularly pays its assessed contribution of USD 8 million per year, based on the country’s GDP. Ethiopia is one of eleven AU Member States that not only pays its contributions in full, but also has been categorized as a tier two contributor. Furthermore, it has donated land worth more than USD 500 million for the old and new AU buildings. Ethiopia is one of five AU Member States that usually makes advance payments. In 2015, when the AU was suffering from one of the worst financial constraints due to a number of reasons, Ethiopia contributed 4 percent of AU’s budget even if it was supposed to contribute only 1.9 percent. Traditionally, Ethiopia, although not necessarily and solely for the sake of the OAU or AU, has provided a secure and enabling environment for the OAU and AU. Ethiopia also grants diplomatic status for AU staff members who are P4 and above, which is better than the standard approach strictly followed by other host nations such as Belgium that confers such status only to head and deputy head of international organizations. However, challenges still remain in the provision of basic services, particularly those delivered by the state, such as energy (electricity), water, health, banking, visa and immigration facilities. Despite its diverse global diplomatic community. Some might argue Addis Ababa is not yet cosmopolitan and lacks many of the cultural, media and consumer facilities such as entertainment, culinary and shopping. More critically, the policy and legislative environment in Ethiopia precludes Pan African think tanks from operating and engaging freely with the AU and its various organs. Moreover, Ethiopia’s commitment to the AU’s ideals and values, as expressed in the various normative instruments of the OAU and AU, falters when it comes to its record in ratification and implementation of the various instruments of the OAU/AU. These include the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, the African Youth Charter, the AU Convention for the protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention), and the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration.

A consequence of the absence of a grand strategy or detailed standalone policy, including strategic diplomatic posts in the international and African system, and candidature strategies and institutions, is that despite putting forward some of its prominent ministers and diplomats as candidates, Ethiopia has failed to occupy any visible, influential professional and elected posts at the AU Commission. In a bid to provide leadership to the AU Commission, Ethiopia unsuccessfully proposed several candidates (including the posts of Commissioner for Economic Affairs in 2017, Peace and Security in 2012, and Political Affairs of the AU Commission in 2003). The same could be said for the Ethiopian candidature for the post of President of the African Development Bank. Due to a weak nomination process and nearly non-existent campaigning strategy, unlike some other countries, Ethiopian candidates were destined to fail. Similarly, Ethiopian staff members of the AU Commission (similar to the Ethiopian presence in other international organizations) hold inconsequential positions and mostly in the realm of support services. They also face serious human rights and administrative violations in their work places.
Without a mechanism for protection and promotion of staff members, Ethiopians are also mostly left without any redress for their grievances.

On the positive side, Ethiopia’s former Minister of Health and Foreign Affairs, and Africa’s candidate for the World Health Organization (WHO), recently defeated candidates from the United Kingdom and Pakistan, thereby winning the post of Director-General. While significant credit for this rare success goes to the nomination and support by the Prime Minister and the Government of Ethiopia, the unified AU support for the candidate also facilitated his election victory.

7.1 Current Host Country Governance

As Addis Ababa is the diplomatic and political capital for Africa and the African Union, as Brussels is to the EU, since 1958 it has signed several Host Country Agreements with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,\(^{124}\) and one with the Organization of African Unity in 1965.\(^{125}\) Since then, there have been several reviews and amendments of these agreements, including the Joint Ethiopia-AU and Joint ECA-AU Committees.\(^{126}\) Currently, the Host Country Agreements are beset by three broad categories of challenges:

1. legal lacunas and inadequacies in the laws and current fragmented agreements;
2. discrepancies in interpretation, and
3. problems of implementation.

Despite the existence of clear legal provisions, problems of implementation arise due to failures of relevant authorities or international organizations to honor and effectively discharge agreed-upon obligations stipulated in the Host Country Agreements. Most often, problems of implementation have to do with bottlenecks occurring at lower levels by implementing authorities rather than senior policy makers. Addressing these problems of implementation requires conducting regular assessments and studies to identify the bottlenecks for implementation reasons and formulating solutions. Most often these solutions encompass training programmes and include issuing clear and detailed guidelines for all authorities with competence to implement the Host Country Agreements. Training manuals on how to handle and manage Host Country issues need to be developed and integrated into formal training programmes conducted by various authorities with specific mandates related to Host Country Agreements. Membership in the PRC Sub-Committee on Headquarters and Liaison Office within the AUC would help significantly help in resolving some of these challenges.

Differences in interpretation arise from differing understandings of the provisions of the Host Country Agreements or other basic international or regional instruments on privileges and immunities. In turn, the question of differences in interpretation may sometimes result from one or more of the following four reasons: (i) inadequate knowledge of international laws; (ii) inattention to the parties to the Host Country Agreement; (iii) the perception of a conflict of interest between the parties; and/or (iv) the perception of a conflict of interest between the relevant international legal instruments and Ethiopia’s legal system. The first two problems are likely to
be easier to resolve than the latter two. Devising effective approaches for overcoming problems three and four would likely require both institutional and legislative measures to produce a solution. The institutional measure requires the establishment of permanent consultation mechanisms in the form of a committee of senior legal experts with detailed knowledge and experience on Host Country Agreements, relevant international and domestic laws, and the modus operandi of Ethiopian and international organizations. In order for such a mechanism to command authority, it should be chosen jointly by the Government of Ethiopia and the main international organization located in the country and approved by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. The Committee may deal with all kinds of problems mentioned above, and also formulate draft Host Country Policy for Ethiopia to be considered by the relevant authorities of the country. The Government of Ethiopia may task the Committee of Experts on Host Country policies and practices to prepare manuals, guidelines and review papers.

Legal lacunas and shortcomings are those that obstruct the fulfilment of the legislative intention of the Host Country Agreements as expressed by the parties when concluded or/and when they conflict with current international norms and practices of host nations. Problems of lacunas and shortcomings are in a sense unavoidable because it is humanly impossible to foresee or accurately predict all-important future issues requiring legal coverage and consideration. In meeting this problem, what is paramount is to be able to devise supplementary agreements that are at least faithful to the original legislative intention underlying the relevant Host Country Agreement. The interpretation and implementation of Host Agreements are supposed to be guided by the principle of the ‘Object and Purpose’ of the agreements as reflected in the original legislative intentions of the Host Country Agreements. Legal lacunas and shortcomings in the Host Country Agreements call for additional legal provisions to clarify those original agreements.

7.2 Benefits as Host Nation

There are economic and political benefits as host nation including economic from household spending and expenditure of directly employed staff members and institutions; to creating local job opportunities. Summit, conference and meeting attendants spend significant amount for host, accommodation and entertainment. In contrast, the Federal Government and City Government of Addis Ababa spend significant amounts for supply of services including security, maintenance etc.

For example, as of 2016, Belgium hosts more than 60 international organizations, 200 offices of European regions, and 160 Embassies. With 40,000 international civil servants, 2500 diplomats and 15,000 lobbyists, it is estimated that there are 105,000 international staff members and their family members residing in Brussels, constituting 10 percent of the population of the city.127

In terms of financial contributions, in 2015 the taxpayers of Belgium contributed 273 euros per head to the European Union, over what they received. Since its accession to the EU, Belgium has paid to the European Union EUR 43.89 Billion over what it has received.128 In return, Belgium
has benefitted from hosting the EU. Speaking to the media on 2010, Jean-Luc Vanraes went so far as to concede that the city's prosperity was "a consequence of the European presence". Because of the EU offices, Brussels' "brand" is worth some $540bn to the city.\textsuperscript{129}

In the case of the USA, while the total expenses of the UN in 2016 amounted to USD 50 billion, in 2016 the UN community contributed more than USD 10.5 billion to the US economy, compared to the USD 10.07 Billion the US assessed and voluntary contributions.\textsuperscript{130} For every USD 1 the US contributes to the UN system, the US receives USD 1.6 back in income from the UN. The annual General Assembly of the UN is attended by thousands of officials.\textsuperscript{131} Over 100 Heads of State and several Foreign Ministers attended the last UNGA meeting in September 2017. The UN also hosts more than 17,600 of the total 44,000 UN Secretariat staff members, in addition to more than 25,000 local workers serving the UN community.\textsuperscript{132} The UN offices and the General Assembly have provided the US with an immense economic advantage. One recent study revealed that businesses in the US generated more than $1.5 billion in contracts with the United Nations between 2014 and 2016. The businesses provided a range of goods and services, including telecommunications, financial services, construction, food production, and production of armored vehicles. In 2016, 118 American companies in 25 states had more than 225 contracts with the UN, totaling almost $539 million. The value of contracts with the UN totaled $450 million in 2015 and $555.5 million in 2014.\textsuperscript{133}

According to a 2014 study by New York City’s Economic Development Corporation, the UN community hired approximately 25,040 full-and-part-time local jobs, with an estimated USD 1.98 billion in payments for local workers. The UN Community further accounted for an estimated USD 3.69 billion in output and USD 3.03 billion in value added in addition to an estimated USD 56 million in net fiscal benefits accrued to the City.\textsuperscript{134}
8. Addis Ababa: as hub of Pan Africa diplomatic community

Addis Ababa, as the seat of the Headquarters of the AU and of various multilaterally and bilaterally accredited missions, delegations and institutions, serves as the diplomatic hub of Africa. Addis Ababa hosts the most important of all AU organs and Pan-African institutions. Chief among these include the AU Commission, the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) of all AU member states, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA). Other Pan-African institutions include the Eastern African Brigade Headquarters and Eastern African Standby Force Logistic Base, the Pan African Chamber of Commerce, as well as IGAD programs such as the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), IGAD Security Sector Program (IGAD-ISSP) and Liaison Offices of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). It also hosts the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the UN office to the AU and more than 27 UN agencies, programmes and funds.

There are also more than 308 accredited diplomatic representatives to Ethiopia and the AU including the United States, the European Union, China, India, Brazil and the United Nations agencies and other international multilateral and humanitarian organizations. While the United States and the European Union (EU) each have two missions – a bilateral Embassy to Ethiopia and a multilateral Permanent Mission to the AU – China and some other countries that currently maintain dual purpose missions have established separate missions to the AU and the GoE. As a result, Addis Ababa is home to 10,560 diplomats and non-Ethiopian diplomatic staff members including those serving international, continental and regional organizations, aid agencies and other liaison offices. At the AU Commission, there are 600 Ethiopia staff members of which 32 percent are professional level.\textsuperscript{135}

On average, Addis Ababa also hosts more than 1100 meetings annually, related to Pan-African issues.\textsuperscript{136} During the January AU regular summits, Addis Ababa hosted an average of 7,200 delegates and more than 40 Heads of State.\textsuperscript{137} In the July 2017 AU Summit, Ethiopia issued badges for more than 7809 official delegates attending the Summit, excluding those who did not receive badges or who attended other side or advocacy meetings. On average, the Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa hosts at least 200 foreign delegates from outside Ethiopia. Various pan African university programmes also host 2603 students.\textsuperscript{138}

In 2016, there were 910,128 recorded arrivals in Ethiopia. Conference attendance in Ethiopia constitutes 9\% (82,000) of the total arrivals at Bole International Airport. More than 120,000 people visit Addis Ababa for official AU related events.\textsuperscript{139}
Table 1: Diplomats and staff members of international organizations 2014/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of diplomats and non-Ethiopian national staff members in Ethiopia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-African diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African diplomats excluding from IGAD countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Members of AU, UN ECA, UN Agencies and other international organizations including aid agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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*Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs April 2016, compiled and computed by Dr. Mehari Taddele Maru.*

A few writers have accused Ethiopia of using its host nation status to pursue its national interests at the cost of its adversarial contests with Somalia and Eritrea and deflecting criticism by the AU on governance within Ethiopia. Several writers question the motive of Ethiopia’s peace and security intervention in Africa, particularly in Somalia due to long-standing historical animosity or with Eritrea due to the border war between May 1998 to June 2000. The AU’s endorsement of IGAD’s call for sanctions against Eritrea in May 2009 and 2011, being a rare acquiescence by the AU in a matter of this nature, has triggered speculations about Ethiopia’s role from behind. This criticism mirrors accusations directed at the US in regard to its manipulation of the UN. Eritrea on several occasions accused the AU for being reluctant to call on Ethiopia to withdraw from the disputed border town of Badme, as it is one of the guarantors of the Algiers peace agreement.

The AU has been criticized for not putting sufficient pressure on Addis Ababa when violent protests were raging, particularly in two of Ethiopia’s largest regions which one pro-Eritrean blogger described as a “useless organization which history will judge harshly.” The AU election observer reports, particularly over the last three consecutive national elections, which approved them as “fair and transparent” have been cited as further examples of how the continental bloc has failed to uphold its standards accordingly. Ethiopia’s also been accused of serving as the AU’s gatekeeper by denying entry to critical journalists and CSOs to attend AU meetings. These critics even went as far as to call upon the AU to move its headquarters from Ethiopia.

Some of these critics fail to understand the role of a host nation and its internal policy. Lacking any substantive merit, these views exaggerate the influence of Ethiopia on the AU and at the same time underestimate the judgement and influence of the AU and its member states. They also assume that the AU’s position on issues of peace and security in the IGAD region emanates not from an aggregation of its own member states’ position but as a result of its support for
Ethiopia’s actions and declarations. For example, the AU issued a statement on Ethiopia’s violent protests gripping the nation over the past two years.\textsuperscript{146}
9. Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper intended to answer seven fundamental questions: (i) Has Ethiopia ever had a grand strategy regarding the OAU/AU, and if so, what are the main tenants of such a grand strategy or policy? (ii) Are there points of convergence and divergence in the policies of the three regimes of Emperor Haile Selassie, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn in respect of the OAU and AU? (iii) The Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) refers to the ‘special responsibilities of Ethiopia’ to the AU. What do ‘special responsibilities’ entail? (iv) which of Ethiopia’s state institutions guide and formulate policies and decisions with regard to the AU and Pan African Community Organizations? (v) Does Ethiopia’s approach to the AU differ from the approaches of other key regional players such as Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Algeria, and if so, how? (vi) if necessary, what considerations should Ethiopia take into account in formulating a strategic policy toward the AU? and (vii) by way of recommendations, what considerations should Ethiopia should into account in formulating a strategic policy towards the AU?

Accordingly, the paper concludes that in spite of being the seedbed for Pan Africanism, the principal force for the establishment of the OAU, and the host of the OAU and AU for almost six decades ago, in all past and current successive governments, Ethiopia lacks a self-contained comprehensive policy toward the OAU/AU that clearly articulates its national interest and how to strategically pursue these interests. It also does not have a policy as a host nation. Ironically, Ethiopia’s relationship with 13 different countries in the world and the European Union are clearly articulated in the FANSPS, while there is no standalone Ethiopia’s strategy or policy on the AU.

Previously, Ethiopia’s OAU policy arose from reaction to internal political consideration (such as threat of secession and irredentism), and global diplomatic and political dynamics in the world order. Ethiopia’s struggle against the threat of expansionist agenda of ‘Greater’ Somalia, and secessionist movement in Eritrea, and OAU’s principle of intangibility of colonial borders constituted essential additional considerations Ethiopia’s policy towards the OAU.

Ethiopia’s Pan-African inclinations stem not only from a strategic national interest, but mainly from its historical legacy of statehood, colonial victimization, external threats to its survival (thus, seeking collective security). The Cold War, the Israel-Palestine conflict, the rise of communism, and animosity from Arab countries have also determined its policies towards Africa. The 1960/70s left-leaning Student Movement has also led to a drastic policy shift of focus in foreign relations towards pro-socialist stance, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-apartheid. The last two- anti-colonialism, and anti-apartheid struggle specially underpinned Ethiopian’s policy towards Africa and OAU.

The end of the Cold War led to the withdrawal of strategic proxy war of the super powers in Africa. The extrication of Africa from colonialism and apartheid, as well as the collapse of Somalian state and independence of Eritrea left Ethiopia’s practical orientation towards OAU/AU without policy pillars.
These factors, as discussed in detail in this paper, have contrived to ensure Ethiopia’s response in a specific and improvised manner. The reactive nature of Ethiopia’s policy decisions within such an environment constrained the development of a long-term Ethiopian grand strategy towards the OAU/AU.

It was also made clear that the relative successes in pursuing Ethiopian policies towards the OAU/AU were fundamentally dependent on the personalities of the country’s leadership. This paper explained that due to the charismatic personality and international fame of Emperor Haile Selassie, and the intellectual competence, persuasive skills and confidence that the late Prime Minister Meles enjoyed in the AU, IGAD and global forums, Ethiopia was able to effectively promote its national interest at the AU and in other forums. Despite the size of a country, leaders have made their countries’ regional players more than what Ethiopia’s power dictates. Ethiopia’s unmatched contributions to the OAU/AU are rooted, not only in Ethiopia’s historical role, but also the unwavering commitment of its leaders.

Ethiopia’s influence in the OAU and on African issues for that matter reached rock bottom during the Derg’s era. Ethiopia enjoyed far less regard and trust by its peers and thus very limited influence in Africa and elsewhere under Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam leadership (1974-1991). This decline in role and influence was partially attributable to political ideology and the Cold War, and the militaristic approaches and lack of vision of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. What is more, the longevity and extraordinary astuteness of Emperor Haile Selassie and Prime Minister Meles have helped in augmenting Ethiopia’s influence in the OAU/AU, which was not the case with Colonel Mengistu’s regime.

In the past decade or so, Ethiopia’s leadership in NEPAD, African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), climate change negotiations, and the appointment of the chair of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (HIP) were highly personalized and dependent on the leadership of Ethiopia under the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn has continued the role played by Prime Minister Meles particularly with regards to IGAD, peacekeeping and mediation efforts in addition to new roles in the Summits on Refugees and UN Security Council. Ethiopia’s role still remains critical in the global platforms.

While the Pan-African positions promoted by the three governments were equally solid, nevertheless, their policies foundations and ambitions in relation to the AU were unambiguously divergent. The regimes of Emperor Haile Selassie and Colonel Mengistu were outward looking and excessively externalized Ethiopia’s internal problems. Signifying the genuine commitment of Ethiopia to the causes of the OAU/AU, successive rulers of Ethiopia (regardless of their diametrically opposed internal policies) have continued to pursue the same policy on the OAU and AU. Ethiopia’s approach to the AU (during Emperor Haile Selassie, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn) is characterized by continuity throughout many decades albeit in the face of significant changes in the internal underpinnings of its regional foreign relations.

Lacking any clear articulation of its national interest, Ethiopia’s positions on continental issues are highly personalized and dependent on its leadership. The 2016 Second Growth and
The Transformation Plan (GTP) of Ministry of Foreign Affairs has introduced more specific form of formulation on AU as Strategic Goal 2. Accordingly, Ethiopia aims to strengthening AU so as it is an effective "instrument for peace, development and integration". It has also four targets focusing on active and substantive participation in the AU agenda; forge common/joint positions on AU agenda with leading and influential AU Member States; instill strong Pan Africanism in the Ethiopian public discourse; and play a leading role to ensure Africa speaks in one voice in international forums. While this formulation is certainly more detailed than the FANSPS, it still remains too broad to provide details on Ethiopia's strategic direction on the AU. Thus, the Second Growth and Transformation Plan of the Ministry is also too broad to be considered a grand strategy.

Nevertheless, irrespective of the personalities of its leaders, Ethiopia’s influence in the IGAD and the AU will continue to grow due to its history, large population, strategic geographic location, military strength and its promising economic performance since the past decade. Needless to say, while Pan-African inclinations, personal motivation, and leadership competence will still be critical; a grand strategy would have institutionalized and consolidated the national interest Ethiopia and helped in the successful discharge of host nations obligations.

9.1 What is then preventing Ethiopia from having a grand strategy towards the AU?

The first reason has to do with the policy orientation of the current government which is extremely inward looking. As indicated in the foreign policy white papers, Ethiopian governments including the current EPRDF led one look at the AU more as a platform to counter threats, and less as a platform for maximizing legitimate opportunities. Thus, for the EPRDF, the AU and the IGAD remain another platform for solving regional challenges that affect Ethiopia’s internal governance and development problems. Consequently, unless directly affecting Ethiopia’s developmental agenda, Ethiopia’s ad hoc approach to the AU and continental affairs remains unambitious and self-restrained. Consequently, Ethiopia’s approach is narrow, reactive and ad hoc. With such deep internal orientation, Ethiopia cannot have a grand strategy regarding the AU. Despite Ethiopia’s prominent role and contributions to the mission and vision of the OAU/AU, Ethiopia’s positions and actions on various OAU/AU agenda items emanate from the general practical position of Pan Africanism and ad hoc practical responses to regional security threats. Consequently, Ethiopia responds only when the AU or UN calls on it to do so.

Enough has changed to be able to expect a grand strategy from Ethiopia regarding the AU. FANSPS needs a fundamental rethinking and reorganization to ensure Ethiopia benefits substantially from the AU. This paper also showed that many host nations have stand-alone host nation policies. Thus, in order to maintain and increase Ethiopia’s influence in the AU, and to clearly define and effectively discharge its obligation as the AU’s host nation, in addition to and beyond the personal capacity of its leaders, Ethiopia needs a strategic long-term policy that sets out the relevant normative, institutional, collaborative and financial framework. Less constrained by changes in ideological positions, grand strategies on the AU would provide details
about how Ethiopia should make use of the AU to effectively foster peace, security, prosperity and stability.

9.2 What considerations should Ethiopia take into account in formulating a strategic policy towards the AU?

In formulating a strategic policy toward the AU, Ethiopia should take the following considerations into account:

First, a grand strategic policy of Ethiopia towards the AU should begin with these enduring endowments that make it a pivotal state on the Pan African landscape. The development of an Ethiopian grand strategy on the AU needs to take into consideration (i) material and economic power; (ii) military capability; (iii) geographic location and related threats and opportunities; (iv) the size of the population; (v) the country’s historical diplomatic legacy and popular support for regional diplomatic influence; and (vi) Ethiopia’s role as the seat of the AU, where it is responsible for facilitating the smooth and effective functioning of the AU and Pan African institutions, should also feature as a key consideration for a grand strategic policy.

The second consideration may need to take Ethiopia’s potential and existing national interest into account. Clearly, mega trends indicate that Africa’s place in the world will increase considerably in the coming years and decades. The AU’s importance and significance in the realm of global governance is expected to grow proportionally. Ethiopia’s continued unceasing political and diplomatic support and leadership will certainly contribute to the attainment of Africa’s rightful place internationally. At the same time, Ethiopia, as one of the leading Member States of the AU, would also benefit from a much stronger AU that speaks with one voice globally. Ethiopia can also promote its national interests, aligned to and pursued in accordance with AU rules and procedures. Most importantly, Ethiopia needs to select areas of focus in the AU where it could take a leadership role for the continent. Previously, Ethiopia showed leadership in NEPAD, APRM, Peace Support Operations, and regarding Climate Change issues, and still exerts a prominent leadership role in peace keeping projects. Ethiopia needs to study and, with foresight, determine the areas where its national interest overlaps with Africa’s interests and capabilities as it has a comparative advantage as a host country, and an indisputable legitimacy to lead. Migration is one area where Ethiopia, as the leading country of destination, transit and origin for large refugee populations and migrants, could exhibit a high degree of leadership to and on behalf of Africans. Thus, a strategic policy needs to create clarity on the strategic underpinning of Ethiopia’s policy toward the AU. As the only foreign policy instrument that might comprehensively enunciate issues of globalization and regional integration, and mechanisms for translating them into action, FANSPS falls short of providing clear, thorough and comprehensive guidance on what constitutes Ethiopia’s policy on the AU. FANSPS’s strengths emanate from its influence on Ethiopia’s internal development on the socio-economic and political fronts. The entire Ethiopian policy and institutional framework revolves around issues of governance and socio-economic development within the country. However, the inward looking
foreign policy perspective of FANSPS fails to provide mechanisms for effectively aligning Ethiopian domestic objectives with Ethiopia’s foreign policy goals.

Third, such strategic policy needs to be proactive unlike the previous reactive stances Ethiopia was known for. In the past decade or so, Ethiopia emerged as a pivotal state and key player on the African landscape. For the EPRDF-led government, it took a decade until 1998 to understand and actively participate in the AU. The Eritrean invasion made the EPRDF open its eyes in the way the earlier Italian invasion and aggression from Somalia did for Emperor Haile Selassie’s government. Ethiopia, a country with a population of 90 million, projected to reach 120 million in the next 20 years, while occupied by its own economic transformation, peace and stability, is nonetheless also critically important for the development of Africa. Anchored in the national interest of Ethiopia, such a grand strategy should promote an outward looking foreign policy in search of economic and integrative opportunities and be able to deal with threats proactively.

Fourth, such a strategic policy has to place Ethiopia not only in a preventive mode, but also needs the foresight to seize and optimize all legitimate opportunities. Ethiopia’s focus has been to use the AU to prevent adversity against its national interest. FANSPS also recognizes the increasingly critical impact of globalization and regional integration on Ethiopia’s peace and development as well as its diplomacy in the region. However, FANSPS needs to articulate how its inward looking foreign policy orientation can seize the opportunities created by the AU and other similar platforms. While FANSPS and supporting institutions amply reflect the national demand, they often fail to proactively seek, identify and seize opportunities within the AU that could benefit Ethiopia and the region. Ethiopia needs to shore up its regional economic and diplomatic standing and advance a more robust and more balanced domestic and foreign policy oriented towards reinforcing diplomatic gains and seizing and maximizing new opportunities in ways that will advance Africa’s common position in concert with Ethiopia’s own national interests.

Fifth, the strategic policy needs to clarify, consolidate and expand the ‘special responsibility’ of Ethiopia as host nation to the AU, the Pan African community and other diplomatic missions and institutions accredited to the AU. Such a strategy should also define the ‘special responsibility’ of Ethiopia to the AU. Such a policy should serve as a framework that offers clear guidelines for all levels of Ethiopian government with some mandate or services rendered to international organizations. Special responsibility should also entail effective delivery of basic services, creating space for Pan-African institutions on dialogue, advocacy and action, and setting an example regarding the visa and mobility regime for Africans. Similarly, Ethiopia, as a founding member of the OAU/AU and host nation of the AU, needs to become exemplary in ratifying and implementing all AU instruments.

9.3 Does Ethiopia need a Host Nation Policy?

Due to lack of Host Nation Policy, so far, the link between being host nation and the responsibilities of Ethiopia, as well as the benefits that could be gained are not well articulated. No significant effort or program has been designed for those residents in the country and
conference participants to encourage and facilitate their touristic visits within Addis Ababa and beyond. In this regard, the importance and significance of a much-needed host nation policy, as part of a grand strategy or standalone policy, cannot be overemphasized. First, FANSPS is too broad to effectively stipulate the special responsibilities of Ethiopia as the host nation of the AU Headquarters, Pan African community, and those representatives and organisations accredited to the AU. It is also too inward-looking to constitute a grand strategy that can clearly identify the specific means of expanding and seizing Ethiopia’s legitimate interests in the AU and Pan African community. Secondly, the existing Host Country Agreements with the AU and other institutions, and relevant circulars designated to manage only specific institutions and aspects of host nation. Hence, they are too narrow to constitute a policy towards the AU and the Pan African community.

Ethiopia has three options for addressing the problems discussed above:

The first option is to issue a supplementary Host Country Agreement or agreements to all existing Host Country Agreements. More importantly, since original legislative intentions could be regressive in nature, such supplementary agreements could also take the current progressive norms and practices of other hosting nations into consideration.

The second option and perhaps the most effective, comprehensive and progressive way of addressing the above challenges would be to formulate a Host Country Policy with Diplomatic and Consular Proclamation. The Host Country Policy, and a Diplomatic and Consular Proclamation may help ensure that the Government of Ethiopia discharges its ultimate responsibilities as imposed by the agreements and conventions relating to hosting nations. The Host Country Policy and Proclamation need to be formulated and interpreted in light of their primary purposes and objectives for creating and maintaining a favorable legal, administrative and service climate that can enable the international organization to fully and effectively discharge its responsibilities and exercise its mandate. Such a standalone policy offers the normative, institutional, collaborative and financial framework governing all aspects of Ethiopia’s obligations as a host nation. To give legal authority to aspects of the Host Country Policy, a Diplomatic and Consular Proclamation may be promulgated following the direction of the policy.

Therefore, the last and most urgent option, and consequential recommendation is that Ethiopia needs to adopt a Host Country Policy that radically overhauls its normative, institutional, collaborative and financial frameworks, not only discharging its duties but making the best out of being a host to one of the highest concentrations of diplomatic representation.

9.4 What will a Host Nation Policy constitute?

Furthermore, a Host Country Policy could define and offer clarity on Ethiopia’s particular interests in the AU. It also creates clarity of purpose and strategic objectives of being host. Furthermore, the same would identify clear and clearly formulated responsibilities and duties of the country, the various institutions of the countries. It is also helpful for continuity, consistence and improvement of the hosting responsibility. The Host Country Policy may also detail the aims and mechanisms of working through Pan African institutions to promote and defend its
national interest and also Pan African positions. More importantly, such policy will need to focus on building the capabilities (normative, leadership, financial, and human resources) of various government offices with mandates and functions related to Africa and the AU. In order to supplement the contributions of Ethiopia to the AU, Ethiopians should be encouraged, coached and supported to serve at Pan African organizations, including the AU. The selection, promotion and support for Ethiopian candidates for appointment to various leadership and professional posts within AU organs needs to be guided by policy and conducted in an institutional and accountable manner within the MoFA.

In a nutshell, such a host country policy would require four components:

(i) a normative framework including a Host Country Policy; (ii) an institutional framework that is well-resourced and autonomous office, similar to that of Belgium attached to the highest executive office, Prime Minister; (iii) a financial framework that guarantees a separate gazetted annual budget allocation; and (iv) a collaborative framework in the form of an inter-ministerial and service agency with a gazetted coordination body led by a senior diplomat to ensure the organization and logistics of the delivery of various services to the AU, the Pan African Community and all other relevant parties.

Before embarking upon drafting a Host Nation Policy, a comprehensive study need to be conducted on the impact and benefits of hosting AU and UN as well as other international and regional organization in Ethiopia. This study complemented by comparative study on host country policy should offer evidence-based formulation of Ethiopian Host Country Policy. This will not only address the various dribbling complaints from the multilateral institutions hosted in Ethiopia but also anchor the benefits and responsibilities of Ethiopia as host nation on strong foundations. The link between being host nation and promotion of tourism targeting those visiting Addis Ababa for conference need to be elaborated in such a study.
III. The Authors

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With more than 18 or so years of management and professional working experience in the African Union (AU), Addis Ababa University and other think tanks with programmes on peace and security, law and governance, strategy and management, human rights, humanitarian and migration issues, Dr. Mehari Taddele Maru is IGAD Lead Migration Expert and Member of Technical Committee of Tana Forum. He was Chief of Staff and Chief Strategist for IGAD South Sudan Mediation, a Lead Member of the AU High Level Advisory Group on Humanitarian Affairs. He also teaches at Addis Ababa University at Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Institute for Federal Studies (IFS), and Geneva Center for Security Policy and Ethiopian Peace Support Training Center. He is a Visiting Professor and was Senior Fellow at the NATO Defense College (NDC), Nigerian Armed Forces Command and Staff College, the UN Institute for Economic Development and Planning (Senegal), and the African Center for Strategic Studies (USA). As high-level professional staff of the AU Commission, Dr. Mehari was Program Coordinator and Legal Expert at the African Union Commission. He has also served as Chief Strategist and Consultant for the AU and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). He drafted AU various blue print policy documents on migration, peace and security, governance, and humanitarian effectiveness, including AU Border Governance Strategy, Common African Position on Humanitarian Effectiveness, Common African Position on Migration and Development, AU Commission Initiative Against Trafficking (AU. COMMIT), and AU Migration Action Plan (2008-2012). He has also reviewed the AU-EU partnership. He developed the Framework for AU-RECs cooperation on African Governance Architecture (AGA), and served as a resource person for the Pan African Migration Forum. Similarly, Dr. Mehari prepared the Strategy for South Sudan Mediation, Report of the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism of South Sudan and facilitated several South Sudan peace consultations. Furthermore, Dr. Mehari drafted the IGAD State of the Region Report, the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy 2020, the State of Peace and Security in IGAD. As migration consultant to IGAD, he has designed the IGAD Migration Action Plan (IMAP), the Migration Priorities program for East and Southern Africa and developed the Action Plan and re-drafted the IGAD Protocol for Free Movement of Persons and facilitated all National Consultative Meetings on Free Movement Protocol. Dr. Mehari also served Program Head for Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis at the Institute for Security Studies, and Director for University Reform at Addis Ababa University including as member of the university Senate, and Policy Committee.

Abel Abate Demissie
Abel Abate Demissie is a researcher and political analyst interested in security, governance, foreign policy and democratization issues in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa region. Abel is a PhD student in Global Studies in a joint program between the University of Leipzig and Institute of Peace and Security Studies of Addis Ababa University. At professional level, he is working as
a Political Analyst covering Ethiopia and the Horn Region in one of the biggest missions in Addis Ababa. Prior to that Abel worked in different positions at the Ethiopian Foreign Relations and Strategic Studies Institute (EFRSSI). Before that he worked at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Addis Ababa Office. Abel has also taught Governance, Diplomacy and International Relations courses in different institutions in Ethiopia. Abel holds master’s Degree from Addis Ababa University and a BA from University of Gondar.

Abel has written and published numerous publications including on Ethiopia’s foreign policy. Ethiopia’s relation with China; Ethiopia’s security and development challenges and the security challenges in South Sudan. Abel has also made numerous high-level policy briefings and presentations over the past seven years. His expertise was used by media organizations including Time, Financial Times, Associated Press, Reuters, AFP, Lemonde and Bloomberg.
In this paper, the term African Union and the OAU are used interchangeably. Since most of the important initiatives by Ethiopia at the AU are always advanced and implemented indirectly through IGAD, Ethiopia’s influence on the AU also reflects its role in IGAD.


Taye Berhanu (2010): An Introduction to Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy, Addis Ababa, p. 42.


Ibid, p. 133.


Taye Berhanu (2010): An Introduction to Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy, Addis Ababa, p. 103.

This, according to Ethiopian political discourse, infers long-term animosity between certain North African and Middle Eastern states such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and other polities who supported the armed groups in Ethiopia as well as the secessionist Eritrean armed struggle and the Somalian expansionist militarily, both financially and diplomatically.


Interview with veteran Ethiopian diplomats, April 12, 2015, Addis Ababa.

Taye Berhanu (2010): An Introduction to Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy, Addis Ababa.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid, p. 113.

Ibid, p. 112.

Ibid, p.31: p.84.


Ibid.

Examples include Ethiopia’s troops in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), UN Mission in South Sudan, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) that is composed exclusively of Ethiopian army troops.


Taye Berhanu (2010): An Introduction to Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy, Addis Ababa, p. 56.


Ibid.


African Union Summit, Transition from the OAU to the African Union (noting that the purpose of the Extraordinary Session entitled “Strengthening OAU Capacity to Enable It to Meet the Challenges of the New Millennium” was to amend the OAU Charter to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the OAU), available at http://archive.is/VJj1 (accessed 11. August 2017).


Information provided by Official at the Ethiopian Government.


136 Interview with staff member of the AU Commission Conference Services Directorate, 10. May 2014.
137 Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 12. April 2016.